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Abstract	
Despite the continuous efforts of the international community to address water scarcity, 
millions of people continue to lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation services. 
Water problems are often explained as natural phenomena or the result of technical 
failures, overlooking the fact that in many cases, water crises are those of socio-political 
inequalities rather than of scarcity. Examining water inequities, as political ecologists 
maintain, requires paying attention to the underlying power structures that perpetuate 
those injustices, and the agency available to people. My case study, located in Tripoli, 
Lebanon, attempts to understand those dynamics, specifically in relation to the role of 
civil society in enacting mass mobilizations around water issues. The latter was clearly 
lacking in the context of not only Tripoli but also on a national level. The Lebanese 
experience shows that the possibility of mobilizing for water equity does not solely 
depend on the prevalence of injustices, but is determined by other factors. This also 
underscores the possibility that hydrosocial agency doesn’t just manifest through 
political claims for water justice such as mass mobilizations. Other invisible struggles 
must not be forgotten when water inequities are the object of interest. Political 
ecologists, therefore, need to pay closer attention to how other forms of agency operate 
in the absence of social mobilization, for such agency is certainly social and ecological, 
and forms part of the fabric of power relations. If this thesis only scratched the surface 
of such practices, I would put them foremost on the future research agenda for 
understanding hydrosocial relations in Lebanon. 
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Introduction	
“Until justice rolls down like water, and righteousness like a mighty stream.” 
 – Martin Luther King 
1 Research	Problem	
Water is life, and its vitality for social wellbeing, dignity, justice, and mere existence is 
irreplaceable. Nevertheless, and despite the continuous efforts of the international 
community to address water scarcity, millions of people continue to lack access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation services (Sadoff et al., 2015; World Bank, 2015). In the 
Middle East specifically, 75% of the population is identified as living under the water 
scarcity level, defined as 1000 m3/year, which is further exacerbated given the violent 
conflicts the region is currently experiencing (UNESCO, 2015). Lebanon is no exception 
as it is believed to be facing a water crisis that is exacerbated by climate change (World 
Bank, 2012), and the recent influx of Syrian refugees (ACTED, 2012). Figure 1 
demonstrates a map of Lebanon. 
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Figure 1: Map of Lebanon (Source: ArcGIS Online) 
2 Research	Objectives	
There is a need to uncover and challenge the underlying socio-economic and political 
power relations that continue to shape and produce inequitable hydrosocial 
configurations. The main objective of my research is to examine the role of civil society 
organizations in promoting water justice, understood here not only as a more equitable 
distribution of water resources, but also as a more democratic approach to water policy. 
In turn, the research also aims to characterize the obstacles that may prevent change 
towards greater levels of water justice. Broadly speaking, the research is informed by 
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the conceptual framework provided by political ecology, combining concerns for political 
economic power relations with other dimensions such as the role of knowledge and 
discourse in shaping debates and limiting democratic access to policy decisions. 
Tripoli is the second largest urban centre in Lebanon and one where poverty 
levels reach as high as 57% (Nehmeh, 2010). Recognizing that poverty exacerbates 
people’s experience of social and environmental injustices, Tripoli represents a relevant 
case study for the research topic at hand. Additionally, Lebanon has undergone 
institutional transformations that align with the neoliberal agenda (Makarem, 2015), and 
is believed to be “the closest [of developing countries in the region] to fulfilling the 
prescription of the mainstream development discourse” (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014, p. 19). A 
neoliberal agenda that values free Market and economic growth above all else was 
seen as capable of transcending violent conflicts that became most vivid during the civil 
war (Baumann, 2012). New policies have opened the way for the private sector to 
become increasingly involved in water services in Tripoli. This is occurring in response 
to failures in the public system of water treatment and delivery, but also in a context 
where the human right to water is increasingly touted by global organizations, 
transnational corporations and political actors at various scales. In light of these 
circumstances, I set out to investigate what the ‘right to water’ means and to what extent 
civil society is involved in grassroots mobilization to address prevalent water injustices. 
The overarching research focus on water justice and civil society organizations 
translates into these specific questions for the case study: 
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1. Is the 'right to water' being invoked in relation to water provision for marginalized 
neighbourhoods in Tripoli, and what kinds of water policy agendas are promoted 
within this discursive frame?  
2. To what extent are civil society organizations active in advocating for water 
justice, and what are the nature of the barriers that they encounter as they seek 
to influence policy debates?  
3. Are civil society organizations effective at building capacity for ordinary citizens to 
become engaged in public debates over water policy?  
 
In the early stages of research I found that, aside from occasional sparse voices, 
there is no evidence of social movements in relation to water advocacy in Tripoli. This 
led me to focus greater attention on two related questions:  
4.  How can we explain the lack of mobilization around water issues, given the 
deteriorated state of water services in Tripoli in particular and Lebanon in 
general?  
5. Given the lack of social mobilization around water justice, what other kinds of 
agency are available to citizens, especially those in marginalized 
neighbourhoods, as they deal with water scarcity? 
The lack of local social movements in Tripoli, along with the relatively modest influence 
of the civil society landscape there, also led me to expand some of my research 
activities to Beirut in order to capture a broader picture of the opportunities and 
constraints shaping citizen engagement with water issues in the country.  
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The rest of this introductory chapter presents a literature review of how water 
problems are explained from the perspective of mainstream neoliberal worldview vs. 
that of political ecology. I then describe the methodology and fieldwork procedures. The 
rest of the thesis falls into three main chapters. Chapter II provides a brief overview of 
Tripoli’s historical, political, and social context. Chapter III explores water issues within 
Tripoli, especially focusing on the nature of public discourse around the ‘right to water’ 
and what it means from the perspectives of research participants. Finally, chapter IV 
offers explanations for the lack of mass mobilization around water injustices, and 
illuminates the largely invisible ways in which citizens cope with water injustices.  
3 Literature	Review	
3.1 The	Nature	of	Water		 	 	
There is a universal acknowledgement of, and efforts to address, the current threats 
and scarcities that water resources are under, yet the very nature of water is differently 
perceived, and even contested, across different fields of knowledge (Melo Zurita et al., 
2015). Within the mainstream international discourse, water is valued for its importance 
in realizing social equity, economic growth, and ecosystem integrity – the three pillars of 
sustainable development as enshrined in the Brundtland Report (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). The United Nations, for example, defines water 
as “an essential primary natural resource upon which nearly all social and economic 
activities and ecosystem functions depend” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 9). Along the same 
lines, the World Water Council describes water as a public good and economic resource 
vital in generating benefits, and a social resource important for wellbeing (WWC, 2015). 
Clearly, water according to the hegemonic worldview is considered a resource and a 
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wealth-generating good that can be managed and controlled with appropriate technical 
solutions realized through financial investments to achieve global sustainable 
development.  
Echoes of this discourse can be found in the news, where the value of water in 
promoting socio-economic growth is emphasized (McCarthy, 2015), and water itself is 
perceived as a commodity that invites the intervention of the private sector (McKenna, 
2015). Indeed, Peter Barbeck-Letmathe, the chairman of Nestlé, has called for 
collaboration with the private sector (Mathiesen, 2016) to achieve the intended water 
goals as framed in the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda: “Goal 6. Ensure 
availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all” (United Nations, 
2015b, p. 20). The hegemonic conceptualization embodies a neoliberal orientation to 
water issues as characterized by Karen Bakker (2005), who warns that such a 
worldview promotes the privatization of water, which consequently leads to further 
marginalization of the poor and the reinforcement of pre-existing inequalities (Castro, 
2008). 
While water according to the neoliberal worldview is identified as a commodity, 
there are other ways of viewing water and water security. For instance, a historical 
materialist approach suggests that material inequalities, i.e. water injustices, lie in 
political and economic processes. Water insecurity then needs to be understood as a 
result of human-nature dynamics, including the social relations of production (Loftus, 
2015). From the perspective of historical materialism, water is perceived “as a combined 
physical and social process, as a hybridized socio-natural flow that fuses together 
nature and society” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 56). This relation between water and 
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society is embodied in certain hydrosocial configurations that are produced through 
political, economic, physical, cultural, and social processes (Swyngedouw, 2009). To 
highlight the role of economic and political dominance in affecting water circulation, 
water activist Robert Kennedy once remarked: “Water no longer flows downhill. It flows 
towards money” (Quoted in Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 56). 
Taking a historical materialist approach as its underlying theoretical basis, the 
rest of the literature review provides an overview of the concepts of water security, 
water governance, and the right to water. Perspectives from the field of political ecology 
are particularly central to arriving at a final characterization of water justice, which in 
turn informs my study.  
3.2 Towards	a	Political	Ecology	of	Water	Justice	
With its roots in political economy, political ecology further expands to study human-
nature relations under the influence of power, which plays a significant role in shaping, 
politicizing, and constructing those relationships (Biersack, 2006; Heynen, Kaika, & 
Swyngedouw, 2006; Peet, Robbins, & Watts, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2009). Hence, 
political ecology aims to investigate the underlying causes of manifest socio-economic 
and environmental inequalities. 
As demonstrated earlier, vulnerable populations have, and will continue to have, 
less access to adequate water and sanitation services as an outcome of the 
contemporary global water crisis, which is only expected to intensify in the foreseeable 
future (World Bank, 2015). A political ecology approach helps in investigating why the 
poor have less access, and how incidents of water injustice persist even in cases where 
access is apparently improved (Truelove, 2011). 
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Political ecologists concur that the right to water should necessitate the right to 
participate in shaping and/or reshaping the hydrosocial landscape (Boelens, 2014; 
Castro, 2007; Linton, 2012; Loftus, 2015; Melo Zurita et al., 2015; Swyngedouw, 2009). 
In pursuit of more equitable hydrosocial landscapes, political ecology is essential in 
understanding processes that underlie water injustices because a political ecology of 
water justice helps in understanding how different political, economic, social, and 
cultural power relations intertwine to produce and reproduce prevailing conditions of 
inequalities. Bringing this perspective to the fore can help us see some of the key 
limitations in the dominant discourses around water security, water governance and the 
right to water. 
3.3 Water	security	
“Ours is a world in which ‘thirsty agriculture’ and ‘thirsty energy’ compete with the needs 
of ‘thirsty cities’”; this is how the senior director of the World Bank’s Global Water 
Practice (GP) described water scarcity, a phenomenon characterized by the increased 
“stress” on water resources, and hence the lack of access to adequate water quantity 
and quality (World Bank, 2015). Some of the identified causes of water stress include 
pollution of freshwater bodies, rising demands of different sectors, rapid population 
growth, unsustainable consumption rates, and an increase in the likelihood and 
magnitude of climate disasters such as floods and droughts (OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 
2015; World Bank, 2015; WWC, 2015; WWF, 2016). Several sources point to the 
associated economic, social, and physical risks, some of which have already started to 
materialize, and are predicted to affect a large proportion of the world’s population – 
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mainly the poorest – by 2050 (McCarthy, 2015; OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015; World 
Bank, 2015; WWF, 2016).  
In the face of increasing water stress around the world, the notion of water 
security has become central to global dialogue and cooperation to address the issue. 
Water security is defined as the ability of populations to access adequate quantity and 
quality of water necessary for maintaining healthy livelihoods, ecosystems, and 
economies within a politically stable atmosphere (UN-Water, 2013). Ultimately, 
improved water security is closely linked to improved human security, the latter defined 
by Barnet and O’Brien (2013) “as a condition in which people and communities have the 
capacity to respond to threats to their basic needs and rights, so that they can live with 
dignity” (p. 375).  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a number of international initiatives have 
sought to promote water security, the first being the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which aimed to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (United Nations, 2015a, 
p. 58). Shortly afterwards, the decade of 2005 to 2015 was declared by the United 
Nations General Assembly as the ‘Water for Life Decade’ to further stress the 
importance of universalizing water services (UNO-IDFA, 2015). Other initiatives include 
the Global Water Partnership’s (GWP) strategy 2009-2013 and that of the World Water 
Council (WWC) 2016-2018, both of which call for universalizing water security. Despite 
the significant increase in the proportion of population now using enhanced water and 
sanitation services, “[m]ost of developing countries remain water insecure” as millions 
still lack access to basic water and sanitation (UNESCO, 2015; World Bank, 2015; 
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WWF, 2016). Hence, the goal of water security remains a priority post 2015 as part of 
the new SDGs agenda, which envisions a world in which water becomes available for 
all by 2030 (UNESCO, 2015). 
These international initiatives arguably fall short in addressing the root causes of 
water insecurity. The dominant approaches to water issues in the international 
community seem to attribute the contemporary water crisis to scarcity in physical 
resources, a problem better addressed through improving the efficiency of water 
services, increasing technical and financial capacity, mitigating water-related risks 
(OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015), and enhanced water management and governance 
(OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015; World Bank, 2015). This perspective overlooks the 
broader socio-economic forces provoking water scarcity, and hence fails to provide 
lasting solutions. Critics of this approach argue that what we need is not just water 
security, but also water justice.  
At the core of the global water crisis, therefore, lie socio-economic inequalities. 
Political ecologists argue that water scarcity is not necessarily the outcome of 
environmental phenomena; rather, it is very much the result of economic and political 
power differentials that determine who has access to and control of water resources 
(Swyngedouw, 2009; Mascarenhas, 2012). Mascarenhas (2012) also attributes water 
scarcity to poverty and injustice as he observes: “power, poverty, and inequality are at 
the heart of today’s water crisis” (p. 52). As access to water, or lack thereof, remains 
shaped by gender, race, religion, and social status (UNO-IDFA, 2015), vulnerable 
populations will continue to bear the greatest burden of water scarcity until further 
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opportunities of empowerment materialize (for more information about regions and 
populations most suceptible to water insecurity, see Sadoff et al., 2015).  
3.4 Governance	
Unequal socio-economic power that results in water scarcity can take the form a 
governance scheme that privileges some and marginalizes others. To some degree, 
such failures are recognized in mainstream approaches to water security, the prevalent 
water crisis being described as largely a “crisis of governance” (WWAP, 2006, p. 49). In 
other words, the potential of water in generating prosperity is undermined given the 
current inadequate, in many cases fragmented and undemocratic, governance 
framework, which – if enhanced – can lead to improved service delivery (World Bank, 
2015; WWAP, 2006, 2015). Additionally, governance is believed to be essential in 
achieving integrated water resources management (IWRM) and limiting pollution of 
freshwater systems (World Bank, 2015; WWAP, 2006), hence the targeting of water 
governance in the SDGs (United Nations, 2015b). An effective water governance 
framework, therefore, is seen to be one that leads to reaping maximum socio-economic 
benefits as part of achieving greater global water security.  
On the other hand, many scholars call attention to the shortcomings in 
mainstream treatment of water governance. Castro (2007), for instance, notes that 
within international institutional discourse, governance is deemed a mere instrument for 
achieving specific social and economic goals; this, he argues, risks de-politicizing and 
neutralizing water management by rendering the process purely technical. Instead, 
governance should be looked at as a process that recognizes the role of social relations 
(Castro, 2007). Castro further emphasizes the importance of reorienting water 
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governance towards a more democratic approach that stems from concerns related to 
sustainability and social justice rather than being reduced to technical fixes. This notion 
of ‘water democracy’ is defined by Bakker (2007) as “decentralized, community-based, 
democratic water management in which water conservation is politically, socio-
economically and culturally inspired rather than economically motivated" (p. 442). 
While the mainstream worldview promotes a top-down approach to water 
governance, where the role of the market remains vital, a democratic framework as put 
forth by political ecologists embodies a grassroots approach that considers water first 
and foremost a public good. Achieving a collective water democracy where the overall 
societal interests are respected is believed to reduce the dire consequences of human-
made water scarcities.  
3.5 The	Potential	and	Limitations	of	the	Right	to	Water	
Around the turn of the century, global movements for water democracy became fixated 
on the human right to water as a key lever for more just and inclusive water governance 
schemes. In many cases, especially in Latin America, social mobilizations at the 
grassroots level succeeded in achieving legal recognition of the right to water (Mottiar, 
2011; Naidoo, Davidson-Hardin, & Harden, 2007; Perera, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012), 
though implementing this right proves to be a process that is at best protracted. In 
response to these movements, the right to water was enshrined in the contstitutions of a 
number of Latin American countries before it obtained global legal recognition alongside 
other human rights. First, the UN General Assembly recognized “the right to safe and 
clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full 
enjoyment of life and all human rights” in its 2010 resolutions (A/RES/64/292, 2010). 
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Later during the same year, the right to safe drinking water and sanitation was 
incorporated in the Human Rights Council resolutions as well (A/HRC/RES/15/9, 2010). 
Consequent to the growing involvement of local and global water justice activists 
in the ‘right to water’ movement, scholars have cautioned that the ‘rights’ approach can 
be limiting (Bakker, 2007; Castro, 2008; Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012). Using 
the ‘right to water’ as a rallying cry by opponents of privatization overlooks the fact that 
the term is not incompatible with the delivery of water services by private companies, 
the strategies of which have often aggravated pre-existing injustices (Bakker, 2007; 
Castro, 2008). Furthermore, the ‘right to water’ term bears the risk of being reduced to 
the right to fixed quantities of water as opposed to signifying a broader notion of rights 
that are associated with social equity and democratic participation in water-related 
decisions (Bakker, 2005; Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2009). 
According to Linton (2012), the hegemonic notion of the ‘right to water’ ignores “the 
social nature of humanity as well as the processual nature of water” (p. 48). Therefore, 
alternate terms such as the ‘commons’ (Bakker, 2007; Shiva, 2002), ‘economies of 
water,’ ‘cultures of water’ (Linton, 2012) and ‘water democracies’ (Castro, 2007) have 
been suggested to refer to hydrosocial relationships that are democratic and inclusive, 
where water is a public good governed by communities. In sum, the ‘right to water’ 
notion could be reductionist, vague, and one that doesn’t necessarily entail water justice. 
Despite the problematic nature of the ‘right to water,’ Sultana and Loftus (2012) 
argue that it can still be a powerful notion vis-à-vis other alternative terms. Legal 
recognition of the right to water, they argue, can be effective in holding authorities 
accountable, thus empowering marginalized communities and mobilizing social 
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movements as demonstrated by water struggles in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Colombia 
(Perera, 2012). Future debates should ensure that the ‘right to water’ moves beyond the 
limitation of fixed quantities towards establishing water democracies where citizen 
participation in decision-making is a fundamental right (Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 
2012). Although legal and political recognition of the right to water continues to be 
relevant, for the purpose of this thesis the notion of water justice offers a more 
appropriate framework for addressing these issues and overcoming the limitations of 
the former term.  
4 Methodology	
For my case study, I adopted two major methodological approaches: ethnography and 
discourse analysis. The ethnographic approach involved in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and non-participant observation. Data collected by means of the indicated 
methods, in addition to reviewing various kinds of physical and digital documents, 
informed the discourse analysis conducted afterwards. The following sections provide a 
brief overview of the selected methods and field procedures. 
Ethics clearance was obtained in May 2016, prior to the commencement of 
fieldwork and recruitment of participants. To ensure the privacy and wellbeing of 
participants, I used pseudonyms, coded field notes, restricted access to data, and kept 
electronic notes on a laptop protected by a password. Potential risks to participants 
were deemed minimal. All electronic and physical data will be disposed of as indicated 
in the ethics contract post the completion of the project, anticipated to take place in 
August 2017.  
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4.1 Literature	Review	
4.1.1 Ethnographic	Approach	
Ethnography as a methodology is common within the social sciences (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007; Hörschelmann & Stenning, 2008; Wall, 2014) due to its 
interdisciplinarity and appropriateness for exploring “various kinds of social practices, 
performances, or lived practices” (Scholl, Lahr-kurten, & Redepenning, 2016, p. 58). 
Although traditionally time intensive (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), ethnographic 
research in its contemporary adaptations is often employed without extended periods of 
time in the field (Wall, 2014), thus being appropriate for short-term qualitative research. 
One such variation is focused ethnography, which is characterized by a specific 
research question, short-term fieldwork, and intensive data collection (Wall, 2014). 
Within an urban setting, this data is usually collected through interviews and non-
participant observation (Jackson, 1985). Given both my familiarity with the context of the 
selected case study and my interest in establishing profound understanding, focused 
ethnography offers an appropriate methodology for intensively collecting data over the 
two-month duration of my fieldwork. 
4.1.2 In-depth	Interviews	
The purpose of interviews is to elicit responses and explore beliefs and motivations 
through verbal exchange with the subjects of research (Dunn, 2005). Interviews can be 
powerful in capturing varying perceptions and opinions about complex issues, 
empowering otherwise marginalized voices, and uncovering meanings beyond the 
scope of other methods, such as non-participant observation or surveys (Dunn, 2005). 
According to Dunn (2005), “[i]nterviews are an excellent method of gaining access to 
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information about events, opinions, and experiences” (p. 80). Furthermore, valuable 
insights can be gained by paying attention to “not just what people tell you, but also how 
they tell it” (Blommaert & Jie, 2010, p. 43, emphasis in original). This can be especially 
informative for the discourse analysis approach used to analyze important aspects of 
the data. 
4.1.3 Non-participant	Observation	
On their own, interviews are insufficient in developing a profound understanding of the 
lived experiences of the research participants and the meanings they associate with a 
certain place – hence the need for a less formalized method of interaction between the 
researcher and participants (Bell, 2013; Kearns, 2005). Moreover, data collected 
through non-participant observation complements interviews such that it allows for a 
better understanding of the social, political, and cultural context in which interviews take 
place (Bell, 2013).  
My research seeks to understand people’s perceptions and experiences, and the 
particular discourses that shape their social realities related to water. Thus, it is 
important to go beyond what has been said or written by looking also for silences, which 
can be achieved through observing the social dynamics and contexts within which such 
interactions take place. During my fieldwork, I observed dynamics in places such as 
NGO offices, public spaces, and communities where water problems are manifest. 
4.1.4 Discourse	Analysis		
Foucault’s theories about the role that language and knowledge production play in 
shaping people’s realities dominate the discourse analysis methodology (Feindt & Oels, 
2005; Waitt, 2005). According to Foucault, discourse is the sum of statements produced 
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through the intertwining of power and knowledge to determine what beliefs are taken to 
represent the ‘truth’, hence, shaping people’s practices and realities (Feindt & Oels, 
2005; Waitt, 2005). Discourse, therefore, is a power mechanism that has the potential 
not only to construct unjust realities, but also to have those realities viewed as inevitable 
or even justified (Waitt, 2005). Consequently, the goal of discourse analysis is to 
“understand how particular ideas are privileged as ‘truth’” (Waitt, 2005, p. 168), usually 
through analyzing both textual and spoken material (Johnston, 2002). In other words, 
the goal of discourse analysis is to understand what and why certain statements 
circulate more widely than others, what beliefs are shaped by these statements, what 
realities are constructed by those beliefs, and the power mechanisms manipulating the 
whole process (Waitt, 2005).  
Investigating discursive structures that produce and maintain inequalities is, 
therefore, crucial to research with justice inclinations. Discourse analysis offers a 
valuable vehicle for this purpose given that: 
Environmental justice scholarship [needs] to actively work at its connections to 
activism and its engagement with those at the sharp end of injustice, however it 
is understood, and to bring theory to bear in meaningful ways into praxis and 
diverse forms of public engagement (Holifield et al. cited in, Schlosberg, 2013, p. 
50).  
In sum, discourse analysis intersects with environmental justice in challenging 
oppressive power structures (Johnston, 2002; Stanley, 2009), which is central to my 
research. Sources typically analyzed include “manifestos, records of debates at 
meetings, actions of political demonstrators, newspaper articles, slogans, speeches, 
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posters, satirical prints, statutes of associations, pamphlets, and so on’ of a time, a 
place, and a people” (Johnston, 2002, p. 67).  
4.2 Data	Collection	and	Analysis	
For my study, I reviewed international reports, scholarly literature, a draft of Lebanese 
Code de L’eau,1 governmental documents, informative brochures distributed by Tripoli’s 
water office, Lebanese NGO and private sector documents, and Lebanese media 
material related to the discourse about water in general and the ‘right to water’ in 
particular. Understanding the contradicting notions of the ‘right to water’ among citizens, 
government officials, private sector representatives, activists, and civil society actors 
constitutes the basis for the discourse analysis of this study. Identifying the ongoing 
debate around the ‘right to water’ in Lebanon helps in understanding what the term 
means for different actors, how it is being used, and to what end.  
The majority of the materials indicated above were accessible in Arabic, the 
official language of the state. Aside from a few scholarly articles that were only available 
in French, I encountered no limitations related to language. Many sources were 
obtained through the Laurier Library, but others were only available from sources that I 
contacted while in the field. A few of the research participants made reference to 
documents that I was unable to access.  
4.2.1 Interviews		
Interviews were conducted with two categories of informants: (a) experts such as NGO 
leaders, activists, academic researchers, representatives from the private sector, and 
policy makers; and (b) residents of an urban neighbourhood. Interviews with experts 
                                            
1 A proposed law that aims to encapsulate all currently-scattered water laws in Lebanon. 
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sought to elicit perceptions and conceptualizations of the ‘right to water’ and ‘water 
justice’ notions, the extent to which these concepts influence the work of civil society, 
barriers that impede achieving water equity, and ways to increase the participation of 
marginalized communities in designing solutions to the prevailing water crisis. On the 
other hand, interviews with ordinary residents aimed to understand the coping 
mechanisms and forms of agency available to them, that is, the ways in which 
communities experience and respond to water injustices within the socio-economic 
structure in place. I was not able to examine those coping strategies in much detail due 
to the limited number of citizen-interviews I could secure. Yet I present in the coming 
chapters information on social agency, which I gathered from other sources in an 
attempt to achieve an adequate understanding of the overall situation of water access 
within Tripoli. The limited data I acquired in that regard led me to modify my approach to 
the analysis phase by focusing less on hydrosocial agency and more on the dynamics 
of civil society as I sought explanations to the lack of mass mobilizations around water 
problems.  
Participant	Recruitment	
Fieldwork took place over the course of two months. I corresponded with several local 
researchers before going into the field in order to gain insights about potential research 
participants and ideas about the lines of questioning I hoped to pursue. Those 
researchers were the first point of contact upon my arrival into the field. Purposeful, 
snowball sampling was used to recruit expert informant participants in order to ensure 
the relevance of the interviewees’ input to the study. Residents, on the other hand, were 
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randomly selected based on (a) the socio-economic condition of their neighbourhoods, 
and (b) availability. No reimbursement was provided. 
Sample	and	Participant	Profiles	
I conducted a total of 23 interviews, of which 20 were with expert informants and 3 with 
residents. The expert informant interviews could be further broken down into 3 with 
government officials, 4 with academic researchers, one interview with 3 representatives 
of the corporate sector, and 10 with activists and/or NGO representatives. The 
interviewees were selected based on their expertise in the water sector, their 
involvement in water-related initiatives, or – more broadly – their involvement in 
advocacy campaigns that indirectly relate to the concept of water justice. Participants 
varied in age and gender; 8 were females and 15 males, all of them above 18 years old. 
Table 1 below provides a brief overview of the research participants. Only participants 
who consented to have their real names used have been identified using full names. 
Table 1: Participant Profiles 
Category Participant Identification Occupation 
Academics 
Christéle Allès Researcher at Université de Nantes, 
Institut de Geographie et D'Amenagement 
Regional de L'Un 
Karim-Phillip Eid-
Sabbagh 
PhD, academic researcher specializing in 
development studies & political economy. 
Previously at the Asfari Institute at the AUB 
Jalal Halawani Head of the Department of Health and 
Environment, Lebanese University 
Rania Masri Associate director at the Asfari Institute for 
Civil Society and Citizenship, American 
University of Beirut (AUB) 
Civil Society 
Representatives 
Hosn Khalaf Social activist and previous member of the 
Friends of Water Association (FWA), Tripoli 
K.S.  Previous member of the FWA, Tripoli 
Samer Annous Academic, independent activist, and leader 
of the Civic Mobilization Network in Tripoli 
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Nariman Shamaa Activist, president of Donia for Sustainable 
Development, and president of the 
Committee for Monitoring Tripoli’s Projects 
Ali Darwish Activist, researcher, & president of Green 
Line NGO, based in Beirut 
Nasser Nasrallah President of Ibrahim Abd Al-Al Foundation, 
based in Beirut 
A.A. Representative of Nahnoo, based in Beirut 
Chadi Nachabe President of Utopia. Politician & municipal 
councillor 
Shafik AbdulRahman Program manager at Utopia, Tripoli 
Omar Asaad Representative of Utopia, Tripoli 
Corporate 
Sector 
Representatives 
George Akl Deputy Chief of Party at Development 
Alternatives Inc. (DAI), Lebanon Water 
Project (LWP), USAID Contractor2 
Salah Saliba USAID Private Sector Engagement Team 
Lead at DAI LWP, USAID Contractor 
Bassam Jaber  Water expert. Consultant for DAI LWP, 
USAID Contractor. Former Director of 
Exploitation, Ministry of Energy and Water 
Government 
Officials 
Maher Tahsaldar Head of the Department of Accountancy, 
North Lebanon Water Establishment (WE). 
Instructor at the College of Business 
Administration, Lebanese University 
D.S. Employee in the North Lebanon WE 
Ziad Hayek Secretary General of the Higher Council for 
Privatization of the Republic of Lebanon 
Citizens Citizens 1; 2; 3 Two housewives, one not determined 
 
While most interviewees agreed to have their interviews recorded, a few refused, 
mainly due to workplace policies that prohibit recordings or for anonymity concerns. 
Interviews with expert informants lasted for an average of 45 to 60 minutes each, while 
those with residents were significantly shorter, each about 10 minutes long. The 
majority of expert informant interviews were one-on-one, but a few were conducted with 
2 or 3 other individuals at the same time (at the request of participants). I adopted a 
semi-structured approach to ensure that the questions I originally set out to investigate 
                                            
2 The views of Akl, Saliba, and Jaber are their own and do not represent those of USAID. 
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were addressed, while allowing for flexibility in incorporating emerging themes not 
previously identified. A semi-structured approach also helped reduce formality and 
establish rapport with informants (Dunn, 2005).  
All 3 residents lived in what would be considered marginalized neighbourhoods in 
Tripoli. I met with 2 of them in their area of residence following my visit to the Hawuz, a 
public water fountain. There, I observed residents filling their water tanks from the public 
fountain and approached a few. One of the bystanders was affiliated with a local 
familial-based NGO, and he liaised with the community to secure the 2 meetings 
mentioned. The interviews were marked by the non-stop passage of bystanders and 
interrupted by occasional exchanges with neighbours. I met with the third citizen in the 
office of one of the NGOs that works in the resident’s neighbourhood.3  
Ten of the expert informant interviewees were based in Tripoli, and the rest in 
Beirut. Even though my intention was to focus on Tripoli, I had to expand my area of 
investigation to Beirut for a number of reasons. First, the centralized nature of policy-
making means that certain important decision-making happens in the capital. Second, 
Beirut is the most vital urban centre, where much of urban activities and development 
projects take place. It hosts a variety of NGOs that work on a diverse range of causes 
throughout Lebanon. Third, the water sector in Beirut suffers from major problems; 
certain areas have witnessed water rationing lasting for a period of four consecutive 
weeks in 2016. This means that Beirut is a fertile ground for the emergence of social 
mobilizations around water. Finally, Beirut has recently witnessed a broad-based social 
                                            
3 The NGO turned down my request to meet in the citizen’s area of residence lest my presence 
might lead others in the neighbourhood to mistakenly expect potential development projects. 
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movement in response to the waste crisis (see Chapter IV), where no such examples 
were available in Tripoli.  
Data collected from interviews was based on accurate and comprehensive field 
notes that I diligently typed up right after each session, referring to the recordings 
(where available) to jog my memory for details. Four interviews were transcribed 
verbatim. During the composition of field notes and the transcription phase, emerging 
themes were directly noted in a separate document. After the preliminary themes had 
been identified, data collected from the interviews was thematically categorized and 
added to this document. The thematic categories formed the basis for structuring the 
chapters and subsections of the thesis.  
4.2.2 Limitations	
Originally, I had intended to interview a larger number of ordinary citizens residing in 
marginalized areas. This, however, was not feasible due to the lack of personal 
connections, potential security risks in some cases, and the time factor. The two months 
period of fieldwork proved inadequate for establishing meaningful relationships that 
would have facilitated accessing certain segments of the population. While the data 
collected from the 3 interviews with householders is of limited utility, it does point to the 
necessity of further research in this direction. Furthermore, I tried to compensate for this 
shortfall through non-participant observation and through putting together pieces of 
information collected during interviews with participants from other categories. Indeed, 
interviews with water experts and NGO representatives provided information – based on 
first-hand experiences and long-term expertise – about how households meet their 
needs of water. The overall picture of water access in Tripoli that I have attempted to 
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construct in Chapter III, while not based on intensive personal interviews with citizens, is 
based on multiple sources of information (e.g. governmental publications, international 
reports, scholarly research, and interviews with experts and NGO representatives), 
which I often found to be in congruence.   
 
 
 30 
Chapter	II:	Context	of	Tripoli,	Lebanon	
1 Historical	and	Political	Context	
Tripoli (see Figure 2), the second largest city in Lebanon, sits on the Mediterranean Sea 
85 km northeast of Beirut. Since its foundation in the 3rd century BCE by the 
Phoenicians, 4  Tripoli has seen the rise and fall of several empires including the 
Mamluks, Crusaders, Romans, Ottomans, and more recently the French.  
 
Figure 2: Map of Tripoli (Source: ArcGIS Online)  
1.1 Emergence	of	modern	Tripoli	
Modern Tripoli emerged in the 16th century during the Ottoman Empire’s rule over what 
is now called the Middle East (Einav, 2015). Due to its strategic location and topography, 
                                            
4 Various speculations about the date of the first settlement in Tripoli exist. Ginzarly and Teller 
(2016) suggest that Tripoli was founded in the 14th century BCE.     
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Tripoli became the main port of Syria’s coast and attained distinguished status as a 
centre of the Ottoman Provincial administration. It emerged as an industrial and 
commercial site. Tripoli is believed to have been a living example of plurality, tolerance, 
and acceptance as different sects co-existed alongside each other in harmony (see 
Reilly, 2016 for an overview of historical analyses).  
1.2 French	Colonialism	and	the	Birth	of	Greater	Lebanon		
The period of French colonialism spelled the beginning of Tripoli’s decline, starting with 
the birth of Greater Lebanon in 1920. During the demarcation of France’s colonial 
territories, Tripoli was unwillingly separated from the Province of Syria and made part of 
the Province of Beirut, subsequently becoming part of the new state of Lebanon. The 
latter was not well received by Tripolitalians, “who saw themselves as an integral part of 
Greater Syria and not of the new state established in the spirit of the Maronite 
Christians and their French patrons” (Einav, 2015, p. 29). Under the new territorial 
arrangements, Beirut was given more importance, and as its status as an emerging 
cultural, political, and economic centre prospered, Tripoli’s declined further. Khaled 
Ziade interprets this process as part of a broader trend of the retraction of the Islamic 
city in the face of the Western model portrayed by Beirut (Reilly, 2016). The tension 
between Tripoli and Beirut continued until after independence. Abd al-Ghani Imad 
argues that the residents of Tripoli associated themselves even more firmly with 
Arabism and conservative Islam as a means to express their alienation and to cultivate 
an identity separate from Western-spirited Beirut (Reilly, 2016). The Arab-Islamic 
orientation continues to characterize the identity of Tripoli to this day (Abi Samra, 2015).  
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1.3 Post-independence	
Upon the end of French colonialism in 1943, subsequent political waves swept over 
Tripoli including Pan-Arabism (Nasserism) in the 1950s, communism, and Islamist 
movements. The history of Tripoli and the rest of Lebanon forever changed with the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Tripoli became a site for active military conflicts, which 
left permanent damage to the pre-existing harmony and cultural ideals of acceptance 
and peaceful co-existence.5 One fruit of the civil war was the armed dispute between 
two of Tripoli’s poorest neighbourhoods: Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen; the violence has 
persisted ever since. 
In 1985, Syrian troops entered Lebanon to end the civil war, thus marking the 
beginning of the era of direct intervention of the Syrian regime in Lebanon’s internal 
affairs. Gade argues that the “internal solidarity” that prevailed among the residents and 
political leaders of Tripoli around anti-imperialism and traditional social norms ceased 
upon the intervention of al-Assad’s regime (Gade, 2015, p. 20). The latter’s direct 
involvement intensified clientelism such that client-patron relations between Lebanese 
political leaders and Syrian military leaders in Lebanon became prominent. Those with 
strong ties with Syrian authorities inevitably attained more clout. 
2 Socio-economic	conditions	
2.1 Social	makeup	
Tripoli is the second largest urban centre in the country, with a population reaching 
nearly half a million. The social makeup consists of a Sunni majority, Christians, and 
                                            
5 With the exception of the town of Mina, where Muslim Sunnis and Orthodox Christians 
refrained from engaging in sectorial conflicts during the civil war – aside from a few outlier 
incidents; both populations continue to live alongside each other (Touma, 2015). 
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Alawis. Sunnis represent 81% of the population, whereas Alawis constitute 9% (Gade, 
2015). The majority of the Alawi population in Lebanon resides in the neighbourhood of 
Jabal Mohsen. Finally, Christians, further identifying as Greek Orthodox, Maronite, 
Armenian, and Melkite Greek Catholic, make up 11%.6 Tripoli also hosts around 70,000 
Syrian refugees (Kabalan, 2016), the majority of whom gravitated towards areas of the 
city that are predominantly alike in religious terms (Mercy Corps, 2013). 
2.2 Economy	
Prior to Tripoli’s integration into the State of Lebanon, it served as a port for Syria’s 
inner cities. As its role as a major port declined, it became involved in the refining 
industry of Iraqi crude oil (Information International SAL, 2001). The main refinery was 
damaged due to several successive conflicts and is now non-functional (Information 
International SAL, 2001). Even after the decline of Tripoli’s status as a main port, its 
economy has continued to be strongly connected to that of Syria. Tripoli also serves as 
a market for the produce of surrounding agricultural plains (Information International 
SAL, 2001).  
In addition to oil storage and refining, trades that flourished in Tripoli include the 
processing of fruit and tobacco, soap manufacturing, fishing, and other artisanal crafts 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). Many of the traditional trades have vanished as a result 
of the modernization process, although some of them are currently seeing a revival 
(Information International SAL, 2001). As large-scale development projects in the area 
are lacking, the economy of contemporary Tripoli depends mainly on small business 
enterprises (Information International SAL, 2001). The most prominent is the food 
                                            
6 Statistics vary by source. 
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industry e.g. Arabic sweet manufacturers, dairy and poultry factories, pastries, 
restaurants, and street vendors. Other businesses include bookstores, consumer shops, 
and furniture making in addition to a number of surviving traditional crafts such as 
fishing, Arabic medicine and spice trades, perfumeries, soap manufacturing, 
shoemaking, wood making, and coppersmiths (Information International SAL, 2001). 
Although Tripoli could potentially serve as an important tourist attraction due to its rich 
historical and cultural heritage, tourism is weak because of the beleaguered state of the 
city’s infrastructure and the ongoing political instability.  
2.3 Living	Conditions	
Questions of water justice, the core of this research, necessitate discussing the 
underlying socio-economic structures that (re)produce and perpetuate injustices. In fact, 
the UN considers poverty an immediate cause of social and environmental inequalities 
that further undermine the ability of affected populations to access resources and fully 
enjoy their rights (Kukrety, Oxfam, & AUB, 2016).  
While the influx of refugees, many of who now reside in impoverished 
neighbourhoods, has exacerbated the already precarious living conditions in Tripoli, the 
refugee crisis is not the root cause of prevailing political and economic problems in the 
city. Even prior to the Syrian conflict, poverty and deprivation levels were significantly 
high. Based on data collected in 2004 as part of a study on the poverty in Lebanon, 
Tripoli scored the second highest in poverty rates (for a comprehensive assessment, 
see Laithy, Abu-Ismail, & Hamdan, 2008). Another study conducted by UN-ESCWA and 
the Arab Development Institute, led by Adib Nehmeh (2010), identified 57% of the 
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households in Tripoli as deprived, and 26% as severely deprived.7 Of the 7 districts in 
Tripoli, 4 are considered deprived, in which case the percentage of deprived households 
surpasses the city’s average of 57% (Nehmeh, 2010). Nehmeh thus concludes that it is 
more accurate to describe Tripoli not as an urban centre with poverty enclaves, but 
rather as an impoverished city with sparse pockets of affluence.  
Within Tripoli itself, noticeable disparities exist between wealthy and 
impoverished suburbs, where segregation is primarily based on social class. Sharper 
than the concentration of poverty in marginalized neighbourhoods is the concentration 
of wealth in their affluent counterparts (Nehmeh, 2010). Such disparities reflect a wider 
pattern of territorial differential of access to rights and resources, which is fundamental 
to the Lebanese socio-political structure.  
2.4 Repercussions	of	the	Syrian	crisis	
The repercussions of the Syrian civil war have been immediately reflected in Tripoli, 
leading to economic and political pressures.  
2.4.1 Economic	impacts	
The economic impacts of the Syrian crisis arise in at least two processes, (a) the 
consequent deterioration of an economic relationship with Syria, and (b) the internal 
competition for scarce resources as a result of the influx of refugees. The living 
conditions in some neighbourhoods that host Syrian refugees in Tripoli, specifically 
                                            
7 The study defines poor families as those whose lifestyle falls below the socially accepted 
standard of living that is necessary to satisfy basic needs essential for leading a dignified life; 
this standard is usually determined through social norms in the area of residence (Nehmeh, 
2010). The Urban Deprivation Index (UDI) was used to measure socio-economic deprivation. 
The UDI comprises of four categories: education level, economic conditions, housing, and 
health insurance. The indicators were used to identify the degree of household deprivation of 
basic needs, resources, capabilities, and rights.  
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Tabbaneh, are equally precarious for both the local communities and the refugees alike 
(Kukrety et al., 2016). This also has social implications that manifest in growing 
animosity towards the displaced Syrians. 
2.4.2 Political	impact	
The increased tension in areas with high concentrations of Syrian refugees is only partly 
the result of increased economic pressures. It is also the outcome of trans-national 
political complications resulting from the longstanding ties between Tripoli and Syria 
(Einav, 2015). First, the crisis in Syria initiated armed conflicts across the Syrian-
Lebanese border. Second, it refuelled the chronic local conflict between two of Tripoli’s 
poorest neighbourhoods: Tabbaneh dominated by the Sunni sect; and Jabal Mohsen, 
inhabited by the Alawi sect. The ongoing civil unrest stems out of the deeper conflicting 
political positions between proponents (Alawis) and opponents (Sunnis) of the Syrian 
regime. While the conflict takes a sectarian tint, it is underpinned and fueled by political 
agendas set by dominant warlords. Such clashes create an atmosphere of fear among 
local communities and refugees alike, and compromise their safety (UNOCHA and 
REACH, 2014). 
2.5 Marginalization	
Citizens of Tripoli believe they have been purposefully neglected by the state. It is not 
uncommon to hear echoes of discourse about Tripoli being a “forgotten city”, “neglected 
city”, and “marginalized city” in daily conversations, social media, newspaper articles 
(see, for example, Abi Samra, 2015; Abouzaki, 2012; Derbas, 2015), and scholarly 
studies (Laithy et al., 2008; Nehmeh, 2010). Such expressions reveal an underlying 
feeling of discrimination shared among the residents of Tripoli. To date, Tripoli and the 
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Northern governorate in general remain underserved in the eyes of the public (Abouzaki, 
2012; MoSA & UNDP, 2007).  
Several studies and political figures confirm this observation. For instance, the 
Social Affairs Minister and native of Tripoli, Rashid Derbas, states that Tripoli “has 
suffered from chronic marginalization and deprivation” (Derbas, 2015, p. 20). Similarly, 
Charbel Nahas, previous Labour Minister, reports that Tripoli has been historically 
neglected by the state, which had not taken measures to develop the city’s fragile 
economy that was already exhausted by the long years of the civil war (Abouzaki, 2012). 
Some scholars (Imad, 2002) and journalists (Abi Samra, 2015) believe that the strategic 
deprivation appears to be a form of punishment for Tripoli’s troubled relation with the 
state since the latter’s formation, and for its stronger affiliation with the principles of 
Arabism and Islamism than with those of a secular state. Feelings of persecution are 
further entrenched given the recurring militant tensions between different factions with 
armed forces (Einav, 2015). 
This perceived neglect by the state may be explained by the territorialisation of 
power and resources. On a political level, an increased number of Sunnis believe they 
have been given a marginal role in the political process (Lefèvre, 2014). On an 
economic level, Sunnis also believe that the Sunni sect shoulders the highest burden of 
socio-economic disparities (Lefèvre, 2014). Moreover, current policies dictate that voting 
happen based on the town of origin rather than of residence. For instance, those who 
are eligible to vote in certain districts within Tripoli, namely the old city centre, reach at 
best 10-15% of the total residents (Information International SAL, 2001). Thus, a large 
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segment of the population lacks political representation and the interests of Tripoli are 
neither represented nor addressed. 
The absence of a strong state necessitates devising alternative routes for 
accessing services. First, it gives way to the increasing role of NGOs as substitute 
service providers (Darwish, 2004). The preoccupation of NGOs with service provision 
undermines their ability to advocate for rights, including the right to water. This is 
examined in further detail in Chapter III. Second, the persistent political crisis reinforces 
and legitimizes patron-client relations within political parties linked to the country’s 
sectarian factions, also discussed in a later chapter of this paper. 
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Chapter	 III:	 The	 right	 to	 water	 in	 Tripoli,	
Lebanon	
In this chapter I investigate the notion of the right to water in the context of Tripoli. I start 
with an overview of the legal history of the right to water in Lebanon and the current 
national governance scheme. Then I explore more closely the state of affairs with 
respect to the right to water, that is, patterns of (in)access to water, at the level of Tripoli 
given the city’s specific hydrosocial configuration. Finally, I present and discuss my 
fieldwork findings, focusing on the participants’ perspectives on the right to water, its 
meaning, and mechanisms of realization to depict an approximate picture of the overall 
public discourse.  
1 Legal	Context	of	The	Right	to	Water		
1.1 Historical	Perspective	
Inspired by religious beliefs that view water as sacred and essential to all forms of life, 
the right to water has existed since ancient times in Lebanon. Customary laws 
acknowledged two major rights derived from Sharia: haq al-shafa (the right to drink), 
and haq al-ray (the right to irrigate and water livestock) (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013; Makdisi, 
2007). The word Sharia itself, conventionally referring to Islamic law, linguistically 
indicates the path to the water spring; it then means both the path to water and water 
law (Naff, 2009). Both haq al-shafa and haq al-ray were stipulated in the Medjellé, the 
Ottoman Civil Code, which was created in 1875 based on the juxtaposition of the 
French Civil Code, Sharia law, and customary laws (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013). Thus, the 
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Medjellé, customs, and an established system of concessions constituted the regulatory 
framework for water use (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013).  
Other existing common proverbs during the Ottoman period that reflect the social 
acceptance of the right to water and the nature of water as a common resource include: 
“people are partners in three: water, pasture, and fire” (B. Jaber, personal 
communication, 2016). Another common proverb was that “water shall not bypass a 
thirsty person” (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). Based on this belief, no one 
could claim the ownership over water, and establishments were prohibited from denying 
water to anyone on the premise of water scarcity, unless technical difficulties were 
involved (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016).  
During the French mandate from 1920 to 1943, two major laws were enacted to 
regulate the water sector. Decree 144 stipulates water as a public domain belonging to 
the state, and decree 320 dictates the protection of public water including groundwater. 
Water rights as prescribed in the Ottoman and French legal provisions, as well as many 
of the usufruct rights to water acquired during that period, remain in effect today.  
1.2 Contemporary	Laws	
The historical recognition of water as a sacred right inspired by religion and culture 
continues to penetrate the consciousness of contemporary Lebanese society. As 
Makdisi (2007) argues, the right to water is also politically accepted such that “no 
Lebanese politician or policymaker would publicly deny that the right of every citizen to 
clean water is sacred, part of Lebanese custom, culture, religion and ultimately a state 
responsibility” (p. 374). Yet this political acceptance fails to translate into mechanisms 
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through which the right to water could be legally granted (Makdisi, 2007). Moreover, 
what this right actually means remains vague. 
Based on the still-effective Medjellé code, decree 144, and decree 320, water is 
considered a public domain that can be neither sold nor owned; exceptions to this 
include rainwater that is collected by individuals, acquired rights to water issued pre-
1925, or water resources existing on private land so long as the extracted amount does 
not exceed 100 m3/day (Makdisi, 2007). In 2000 the water sector witnessed a major 
reform since independence. The reform did not, however, explicitly stipulate the right to 
water as a legal right. In effect, water laws and regulations have remained scattered, 
ambiguous, and conflicting (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). In an attempt to 
address this ambiguity and confusion, a water law that encompasses all water laws was 
proposed in 2005.  
1.2.1 Code	de	L’eau	
Code de L’eau was prepared in 2005 by the MoEW and financed by the Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD). It was to serve as a comprehensive water law to 
update the pre-existing, out-dated water laws and resolve the fragmentation of 
responsibilities across multiple bodies (The Republic of Lebanon, 2005). Code de L’eau 
is considered the first legal recognition of the right to water such that “water as a right 
was stated for the first time” (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). It further 
maintains the essence of pre-existing laws, where water is considered a public domain 
and water provision is overseen by the state (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). 
Clause #5 of Code de L’eau stipulates the right of every citizen to obtain enough water 
to cover basic needs for maintaining a dignified life (The Republic of Lebanon, 2005, p. 
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13). In return, citizens are required to pay a tariff specified by each regional water 
establishment to cover the costs of water service; the tariff is to be consumption-based, 
and should consider the socio-economic circumstances of the beneficiaries (The 
Republic of Lebanon, 2005, p. 30). Nevertheless, some of the law provisions are vague. 
For example, while clause #5 enshrines the right of every citizen to a quantity of water 
enough to satisfy basic needs, it does not specify what this minimum basic amount 
should be.  
To date, Code de L’eau remains a legislative proposal, without active political 
processes to move it forward (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). Thus, besides 
the customary recognition of the right to water, no legal instrument exists to ensure its 
material realization. Expanding on this scenario, Makdisi explains that the discrepancy 
between the general acceptance of the right to water, on the one hand, and the lack of 
concrete law and regulations to protect that right, on the other, is due to four major 
constraints: (a) lack of political will, (b) lack of capacity, (c) transboundary water security, 
and (d) pressures for the neoliberalization of the water sector, which have been present 
at least since the turn of the century (for a thorough analysis of the four factors refer to 
Makdisi, 2007, p. 382). The next section explores some of these constraints in relation 
to water governance. 
2 Governance	Scheme	of	the	Water	Sector	
The current governance framework is informed by the codes and laws established 
during the Ottoman ruling period and the French mandate (see Appendix B for a list of 
effective water laws) (ECODIT, 2015; Farajalla, Kerkezian, Farhat, El Hajj, & Matta, 
2015; Makdisi, 2007; MOE, UNDP, & ECODIT, 2011). In 2000, a major administrative 
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reform of the water sector took place. It encouraged the commercialization of water 
establishments, increased participation of stakeholders, adoption of integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) practices, and decentralization of water governance 
(Allès, 2012).  
The reform was a precondition, required by international and bilateral lenders 
and aid agencies, for receiving international funds to rehabilitate the damaged water 
infrastructure after the civil war (Allès, 2012). Rehabilitation and development projects 
were financed by international funds in the form of loans and grants, namely through the 
World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the 
European Union as well as French, Italian, German, Japanese, and Arab governments 
and agencies (Darwish, 2004). This raises questions of the political influence of 
international actors on the policymaking process (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). Despite this 
influence, implemented projects lacked clear planning and were not immune to local 
political influence such that they were often executed according to the political interests 
of the elite rather than national concerns (Darwish, 2004). Through maintaining control 
over financial and administrative bodies, the elite are able to sabotage internationally-
inspired policy reforms and development projects that fail to align with their interests 
(Eid-Sabbagh, 2014).  
Prior to 2000, water was governed by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) 
in addition to 21 regional water authorities and 200 local committees (ECODIT, 2015; 
Farajalla et al., 2015; Makdisi, 2007; MOE et al., 2011). With the introduction of law 221 
in 2000, however, governance was decentralized to four Regional Water 
Establishments (RWEs) (Makdisi, 2007). Accordingly, the water sector is governed by 
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the MoEW in addition to the recently established RWEs, with supposedly more 
autonomy granted to the latter. It should be noted that the rearranged governance 
structure is sometimes described as “decentralized” (Allès, 2012; Makdisi, 2007), and 
other times as “centralized” (Allès & Brochier-Puig, 2013; MOE et al., 2011). The reform 
can be seen as decentralization given the increased devolution of responsibilities to the 
regional RWEs. Yet it can also be considered as regional centralization in the sense 
that (a) four regional RWEs replaced the 21 water offices and local 200+ committees 
that traditionally oversaw water affairs; and (b) the new regional RWEs have limited 
autonomy as the MoEW continues to be largely involved in the management of the 
water sector. Another aim of the administrative reform was to lay the foundation for the 
increased involvement of the private sector in water management through promoting the 
commercialization of the water sector. As we will see below, this aim was not fully 
implemented.  
Despite the reform, water governance and legislation continues to be fragmented 
across several institutions and governmental bodies, with their roles poorly coordinated 
and often overlapping (Abbas & Lovett, 2014; Farajalla et al., 2015; MoEW, 2012; 
OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010). Eid-Sabbagh identifies four categories of actors 
involved directly or indirectly in the water governance process. The main influencers 
include the MoEW and RWEs, followed by other ministries, municipalities, and 
legislative bodies (see Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 in Appendix A for more 
information about relevant actors). In addition to the lack of financial and administrative 
capacity of the water management entities, water governance is further complicated by 
political influence from local leaders, especially given the prevalence of clientelism, 
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corruption, and lax law enforcement (Abbas & Lovett, 2014; Farajalla et al., 2015; 
MoEW, 2012; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010). 
2.1 A	Shift	Towards	a	Neoliberalized	Water	Sector	
A mainstream neoliberal agenda, of which the reformed water sector was part, is 
promoted in Lebanon. As numerous scholars have noted, one key dimension of 
neoliberal discourse around water is to naturalize the notion of scarcity as the key issue 
to be resolved. A discourse of water scarcity is found in governmental reports such that 
the factors undermining adequate water quality and quantity are identified as 
“population growth and age structure, urbanization, economic growth and, more recently, 
climate change” (MOE et al., 2011, p. 53). In response to the anticipated scarcity and 
based on a discourse of technological fixes, the MoEW launched a 10-year plan in the 
late 1990s, proposing the construction of 17 dams throughout the country to harvest an 
additional 650 million m3 (MOE et al., 2011). The plan also aimed to address 
wastewater issues and implement several irrigation and potable water ventures (Makdisi, 
2007). The project was to be completed by 2010, but only one dam has been 
established since then (MOE et al., 2011). A report published by the Ministry of 
Environment (MOE) views the completed dam of Chabrouh as “a much-needed water 
reservoir for the upper Kesrouan region [which] should serve as a case study for future 
dam projects in the country” (MOE et al., 2011, p. 75).  
Other examples of incomplete initiatives include, more recently, the National 
Water Sector Strategy (NWSS) proposed in 2010. The NWSS came as a reproduction 
of the 10-year plan (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014), emerging out of the collaboration between 
national stakeholders and international agencies such as the German Development 
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Cooperation (through GIZ), the World Bank, USAID, and others (MoEW, 2012). It 
aspires to address the projected increase in demand by reshaping the water sector and 
addressing its managerial and technical failures through dam construction, institutional 
reforms, the adoption of IWRM practices, and private sector involvement (MOE et al., 
2011). Despite its ambitious aspirations, progress towards implementation of the 
strategy is very slow (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012). With respect to the NWSS’s embrace 
of the IWRM approach, several factors hinder its implementation as there is “not enough 
devolution to the regional water authorities to facilitate integrated basin level 
management”, and “the approach remains top-down centralised decision making” (MOE 
et al., 2011, p. 81). There is little faith that this strategy will be successfully implemented, 
and no good reasons to believe otherwise; as one participant put it: “It is really just a 
marketing tool. Nothing has been implemented and it is all a lie” (D.S., personal 
communication, 2016). Also, the numerous newly-built wastewater plants in various 
cities remain non-operational, as raw sewage continues to contaminate surface and 
groundwater (MOE et al., 2011). 
2.2 Involvement	of	the	Private	Sector	
The 221/2000 reform facilitated the commercialization of the water sector, leading to the 
establishment of the first public-private partnership (PPP) in Lebanon. Funded by AFD 
and contracted to Ondeo-Liban, which is a subsidiary firm affiliated with Suez-
Environment, the PPP was established in 2003 to improve the quality of water services 
in Tripoli (Allès, 2012; ECODIT, 2015; Yamout & Jamali, 2007). Some of the successes 
this initiative has achieved are evident in the increased efficiency and continuity of water 
services in Tripoli, which enjoys better water supply than other areas (Allès, 2012; 
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ECODIT, 2015; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010). The contract was discontinued, 
however, in 2007 due to political complications and the lack of a clear regulatory 
framework for PPPs in Lebanese law (Masri, 2015; OECD, 2010). 
Another recent initiative that illustrates the push for privatization in Lebanon is the 
recent Blue Gold Campaign. Proposed by the Civic Influence Hub (CIH), an 
organization founded by notable businessmen to promote economic and social 
development, the 5-year Blue Gold plan aims to increase water availability to 500 million 
m3 by 2020, and to one billion m3 by 2030 (CIH, 2013). This is to be done through 
increasing water harvesting, optimizing water demand, enhancing water quality, and 
implementing institutional reforms (CIH, 2013). Along the same lines, the Higher Council 
for Privatization has been advocating for a legislation that aims to facilitate and regulate 
PPPs, which, if implemented, will extend to the water sector (Z. Hayek, personal 
communication, 2016). Hayek, the Secretary General, indicated that the legislation 
attempts to achieve transparency and better governance by altering the current 
dynamics of power; it embodies a real partnership between all stakeholders: the private 
sector, ministries, municipalities, and civil society. The legislation has not been 
approved by the Council of Ministers due to political complexities (Z. Hayek, personal 
communication, 2016).  
The water sector is also marked by an increased influence of private vendors. 
The inadequacy of the public network in meeting the needs of citizens along with the 
lack of trust in public water gave way to the increased involvement of private vendors, 
many of whom lack legal accreditation or official licensing (World Bank, 2010). The 
Ministry of Health reported that only 38 out of several hundreds bottling plants are 
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licensed (ECODIT, 2015). The water private sector remains largely unregulated yet 
critically influential given its dominance in the water market (MOE et al., 2011; World 
Bank, 2010).  
Despite the pernicious effects of an unregulated bottled water industry, several 
participants believe that the private sector could have a positive role to play. As many 
would argue, the strategic involvement of the private sector could prove effective for 
improving water supply and relieving some of the current cost burden associated with 
obtaining bottled water (S. Saliba, and Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). The 
careful involvement of the private sector through management contracts and service 
provision, for example, may represent a move towards better accessibility to and 
affordability of water (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Some observers close 
to decision-making processes see privatization as a potential solution to some of the 
governance issues in Lebanon. For engaging the private sector could be a strategy to 
combat the clientelism and corruption prevalent within governmental bodies, in other 
words, a way for developing public institutions independent from the elite's interests as 
suggested by the World Bank (Allès, 2012). In this sense, “the Ondeo experiment could 
then be seen as a process of state territorialisation facing competing territorialisations 
led by local elites” (Allès, 2012, p. 397).8  
Yet Salah Saliba9 cautions that engaging the private sector is a “tricky matter” 
because it requires a strong state, good governance, transparency, and regulation 
(personal communication, 2016). These conditions are lacking within Lebanese politics. 
Ziad Hayek acknowledged the risks that may accompany the implementation PPPs, 
                                            
8 Referencing Verdeil.  
9 Saliba is the Private Sector Engagement Team Leader of the Lebanon Water Program (LWP) 
at the Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), which is affiliated with USAID. 
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especially that the experience of PPPs worldwide has produced mixed results, both 
positive and negative, and thus has to be approached “with a lot of care” (personal 
communication, 2016). Additionally, engaging private firms in the management of the 
water sector is particularly risky given the failed privatization initiatives of the electricity 
and telecommunication sectors. According to Allès (2012), "past experiments with 
privatization in Lebanon have often been perceived as serving the commercial and 
political interests of the ruling elites of the country, especially the former prime minister 
Rafik Hariri and his entourage” (p. 397).10 
As shown in this section, governmental experts recognize the ineffective 
governance and legislative structure of the water sector as an impediment to a 
functional water sector. Yet this recognition takes place within a mainstream neoliberal 
discourse that advances the involvement of the private sector as a solution. Given the 
absence of the preconditions for a successful privatization initiative that also protects 
the rights of citizens, as well as the failed precedents of privatizing the electricity and 
telecommunication sectors, serious concerns arise about the potential success of 
involving the private sector in the management of water affairs. As Allès (2012) argues, 
privatization projects, especially those undertaken by international companies that are 
detached from the local context, should be studied against the particular political 
economic situation within which they are intended to occur.  
3 Current	State	of	The	Right	to	Water	in	Tripoli	
From the preceding assessment, it is clear that the water sector suffers from technical, 
financial, institutional, political, and administrative failures that undermine the realization 
                                            
10 Referencing Leenders. 
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of the human right to water. Problems range from the fragile infrastructure, legal 
ambiguities, lax enforcement, depletion of water resources, public debt, and lack of 
capacity of the RWEs, to political complications such as corruption, clientelism, and a 
lack of political will to address water issues (Darwish, 2004; Eid-Sabbagh, 2014; 
Farajalla et al., 2015; Makdisi, 2007). Thus, despite the customary and political 
acceptance of the right to water, it remains inaccessible to certain segments of the 
population. This also remains true in the case of Tripoli in spite of the advances 
achieved through the Ondeo-Liban PPP as shall be shown in the next section.  
Accurate and up-to-date data on water availability, accessibility, and patterns of 
demand and consumption by regions is lacking for Lebanon. Estimates of water 
connection rates, demand, and usage at the national level exist, yet they vary across 
different reports, presenting challenges to constructing a cohesive picture in the 
sections that follow. Available information dates back to the period prior to the outbreak 
of the Syrian civil war in 2011 (see, for instance, Republic of Lebanon & UNDP, 2013). 
Since then, the majority of recent international reports have assessed water and 
sanitation conditions in relation to Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities 
(ACTED, 2012). Given the lack of similar statistics at the level of Tripoli, I am compelled 
to use the available data on the national trends of water demand and consumption to 
provide an approximation. Needless to say, there is much room for error here and these 
numbers should be viewed with caution. The following sub-sections assess the current 
state of the right to water in Tripoli based on water availability, accessibility, affordability, 
and quality; infrastructure conditions; and the degree of access provided to 
impoverished populations and those without a legal status. 
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3.1 Water	Availability	and	Accessibility	
The MoEW estimated the available renewable water resources per capita as 1,100 
m3/year (MOE et al., 2011). The North Lebanon Water Establishment (WE) serves 
Tripoli along with 7 other districts, each having its own water sources (D.S., personal 
communication, 2016). Two major springs supply water to Tripoli: Hab and Abou Halqa, 
both of which provide around 70,000 m3 of water per day to 100,000 registered users; 
the deficit is compensated with groundwater coming from wells (J. Halawani, personal 
communication, 2016). In total, the WE has the capacity to supply 90,000 m3 on a daily 
basis, a quantity believed to exceed demand (D.S., personal communication, 2016), 
although a report by the World Bank suggests that the RWEs fall short in meeting the 
basic needs of households (World Bank, 2010). Accurate statistics on the total 
population in Tripoli is unavailable, but estimates range from 450,000 to 600,000 
including Syrian refugees (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016); the World Bank 
estimates Tripoli’s inhabitants at 500,000 (World Bank, 2010). The increased demand 
on water as a result of the influx of refugees has been estimated at 7% (Republic of 
Lebanon & UNDP, 2013).  
The fact that only 100,000 of the residents are official subscribers to the network 
raises questions about water accessibility for the rest of the population. Some obtain 
water through alternative means, which may include illegal connections to the public 
network, private wells, water facilities installed by internationally-funded NGOs, or 
reliance on public fountains, social networks, or private sources such as bottled water. 
For instance, the majority of residents in the Dam & Farz affluent neighbourhood are not 
connected to the public network and rely instead on groundwater, despite the fact that 
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the area is relatively newly developed (D.S.; J. Halawani, personal communication, 
2016). Due to the proximity of the neighbourhood to the coast, the overuse of 
groundwater and the consequent sea intrusion has affected the quality of groundwater, 
thus compelling the residents to eventually subscribe to the public network anyway 
(D.S., personal communication, 2016).  
While water shortage and frequent rationing stretches all over Lebanon, 
accessibility is especially an issue in marginalized areas as the allocation of resources, 
including water, happens on the basis of class and regional privileges (Makdisi, 2007). 
Ultimately, the uneven patterns of accessibility pertain to sectarian and political divisions 
of power and resources, because “while all regions are confessionally mixed, each one 
– with the exception of Beirut – has one pronounced sectarian majority” (Eid-Sabbagh, 
2014, p. 75).  
On a national level, the proportion of the population that uses the public network 
for drinking purposes varies between 35% (Republic of Lebanon & UNDP, 2013), and 
56% as reported by the CDR (Makdisi, 2007). Table 2 below summarizes the 
proportions of households that relied on different sources of water in some of Tripoli’s 
neighbourhoods in 2006 (see Figure 3 for a map of Tripoli’s layout). Despite the 
agreement on the superiority of the supply service in Tripoli in comparison to most other 
areas in the country, close investigation reveals invisible problems with access to water 
within some of the impoverished suburbs in the city (as discussed in section 3.7).  
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Figure 3: Layout of Tripoli (Source: Basemap obtained from Google Maps)  
Table 2: Household water supply in Tripoli 2006 (%). Adapted from (Kayal, 2006, cited in Allès, 2012)  
Sources of water by 
household 
Qobbeh Abou Samra Old City New City 
Public network 69 58 67 3 
Artesian well 13 4 - 9 
Public fountain - 5 - - 
Public network + artesian well  1 2 22 2 
Public network + artesian well 
+bottled water 
1 2 2 24 
Public network + bottled water 11 15 7 48 
Artesian well + bottled water 5 12 1 14 
New City 
Old City 
Dam & Farz 
Abou Samra 
Tabbaneh 
Qobbeh 
Mina 
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Illegal connection - - 1 - 
3.2 Water	Demand	and	Consumption	Patterns	
Lebanon has been long believed to possess ample amounts of freshwater in 
comparison to neighbouring countries. Yet its water resources fail to satisfy the needs of 
the growing population and current consumption patterns. Water shortage and poor 
quality is a nation-wide issue, especially during the dry season. Some believe, however, 
that Lebanon’s precipitation levels should be sufficient to satisfy demand if water 
resources were properly managed (Darwish, 2004; Republic of Lebanon & UNDP, 
2013).  
Due to the lack of water metering in Lebanon, available data on consumption 
patterns is meagre. Nationally, across both rural and urban settings, domestic water 
demand represented 25% of the total demand in 2003, expected to reach 45% by 2030 
(World Bank, 2010). Estimates of domestic water consumption range from 100 L/day, 
the national average (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016), to 140 L/day, 180 
L/day, and 200 L/day depending on the report (MOE et al., 2011). Within urban 
dwellings, the average daily consumption is estimated at 200 to 250 L/person (Makdisi, 
2007). Water consumption can reach as high as 265 L/day in affluent neighbourhoods, 
as is the case in the Dam & Farz neighbourhood in Tripoli (J. Halawani, personal 
communication, 2016). This amount is projected to reach 300 L/person/day by 2030 
(Makdisi, 2007). The World Bank (2010) further breaks down domestic water 
consumption of the households connected to the public network into categories 
depending on the source of water supply: public water, delivery truck, water gallons, 
bottled water (see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Estimated expenditure and consumption by water source for connected households (adapted from 
World Bank, 2010, p. 33) 
 Price range 
(USD/m3) 
Annual household 
expenditure 
(USD/HH/year) 
Estimated 
consumption 
(L/capita/day) 
Public water supply 0.3 – 0.8  112 187 
Delivery trucks 3 – 6  72 10 
Gallons 100 – 220  143 0.5 
Water bottles 440 – 500  72 0.1  
3.3 Condition	of	the	Water	Infrastructure	
The literature reports a poor condition of the water infrastructure, devastated during the 
civil war and never fully rehabilitated afterwards (Darwish, 2004; Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). 
According to experts, 100% of the primary network has been rehabilitated within the 
past 20 years in comparison to 80% of the secondary network and 50% of the tertiary 
network (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).  
In terms of maintenance, the RWE assumes responsibility for the maintenance of 
the primary and secondary networks, while ensuring a clean and functional water supply 
network from the entrance of a building to the individual apartments is the responsibility 
of the house owner or tenant (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Estimated 
network losses range from 35% to 50% (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012; MOE et al., 2011; 
World Bank, 2010). Despite the reported significant decrease in network losses in 
Tripoli as a result of the 2004 – 2007 PPP project (World Bank, 2010), assessment 
reports indicate that the contracting company, Ondeo, fell short in meeting its objective 
of loss reduction (Allès, 2012). The network performance, thus, remains inadequate.  
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3.4 Water	Quality	
Data on the quality of drinking water in Lebanon is scarce. Yet several reports admit the 
widespread issue of water contamination all over Lebanon due to the lack of wastewater 
treatment, inefficiency of the sewer system, and seawater intrusion (El-Jisr & 
Chabarekh, 2012). Nationally, contamination levels were found to be as high as 70% in 
tested water, both piped and at the source, while 24% of the sampled privately-supplied 
water was found microbiologically contaminated (Makdisi, 2007). Additionally, coastal 
aquifers, which represent a major source of drinking water for many households in 
Tripoli, are characterized by high levels of salinity due to the overuse of groundwater 
and the consequent seawater intrusion, as has been the case in the Dam & Farz 
neighbourhood; many of the wells are no longer operational (MOE et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, and although data is lacking, water professionals across a number of 
organizations believe in the superiority of the quality of municipal water delivered by the 
North Lebanon WE (D.S.; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). According to 
Halawani, 50 water samples are tested at the source, storage tanks, and pipes on a 
daily basis.   
This view is not shared by citizens, many of whom distrust the quality of tap 
water. This is evident in the fact that a low percentage, 35% or 56% depending on the 
report, of connected households use the public network for drinking purposes. Mistrust 
seems to be an issue even among authorities at the North Lebanon WE as apparent 
from the incident one participant recounted in one of the interviews. During a meeting 
between the members of the Friends of Water Association and authorities from the WE, 
a particular governmental official used bottled water and refused to drink tap water in 
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fear of waterborne disease. Upon the participant’s insistence, the official reluctantly 
conceded to drink a cup of tap water, but jokingly promised to sue her were he to come 
to any harm. Also, previous reports of pollution during the olive-harvesting season  have 
aggravated the public’s mistrust in the quality of public water (B. Jaber; H. Khalaf, 
personal communication, 2016). Olive processing factories are known to have dumped 
untreated waste into open water bodies, with residue making its way into the drinking 
water system, altering the quality of tap water and generating an unpleasant taste. 
Despite efforts to crack down on this practice (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; S. Saliba, 
personal communication, 2016), people’s trust has not been restored. Even in cases 
where affluent citizens receive a continuous supply of municipal water, they continue to 
rely on other sources to secure drinking water. 
3.5 Water	Affordability	
The current tariff structure is a flat rate based on a fixed annual subscription, regardless 
of consumption patterns or socio-economic conditions. Fees are based on the spatial 
area of residential units as shown in the table below. The minimum subscription fee is 
based on a maximum consumption rate of 1 m3/day. An ascending consumption-based 
fee applies when consumption volumes exceed 3 m3/day (D.S., personal 
communication, 2016). While the minimum subscription fee, equivalent to USD 145, is 
not considered extravagant, it does not take the user’s income into account (World Bank, 
2010). Users unable to pay the full amount have only the option to pay the fees in 
smaller instalments over the year (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012).  
Table 4: Water tariff in Tripoli as of 2012 (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012) 
Area (m2) Minimum quantity 
(m3/day) 
Fees (L.L.)  Fees (USD) 
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<200 1 220,000 145 
200 to 300 2 420,000 280 
>300 3 618,000 410 
 
Nationally, households connected to the public network nevertheless spend 
around 65% of their total water expenditure on private vendors whereas un-connected 
households spend up to 75%. Of that expenditure, 35% is spent on water gallons,11 
21% on water supplied through delivery trucks, and 16% on small water bottles (World 
Bank, 2010).12 The expenditure on gallon and bottled water is high despite their low 
quantity consumption in comparison to that of water supplied through the public network 
or delivery trucks (World Bank, 2010). 
 
Water prices according to the source of supply are as follows: 0.3 to 0.8 USD/m3 
for public water, 3 to 6 USD/m3 for delivery truck, 100 to 220 USD/m3 for water gallons, 
and 440-500 USD/m3 for bottled water (See Table 3). The total amount a single 
household spends to purchase privately-supplied water (gallons, bottled, and truck-
delivered) becomes close to USD 300. One of the interviewees, however, reported 
higher numbers: 
According to the World Bank, people spend from $250 to $300 a year to buy 
bottled water because of the lack of trust in the public service. Also, during 
periods of intermittent supply of water people resort to water tankers. So if you 
                                            
11 The report does not define water gallons. It is assumed, based on conventional terms, that a 
gallon here indicates a water container with a 5-gallon capacity. 
12 The mismatch between the reported numbers and the total comes from the original source. 
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account for these, one pays $800 to a $1000 a year to get water on top of that 
supplied through the public network (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). 
 
In any case, as the majority of households, connected or unconnected to the 
public network, rely on private sources to obtain drinking water, users end up paying 
twice or triple the water tariff (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012). The resultant financial burden 
proves especially taxing for economically deprived households. 
3.6 Injustice	for	Low-income	Populations		
The injustice inflicted upon the socio-economically disadvantaged segments of society 
is manifold, pertaining to both the water tariff and intermittent water supply. Although the 
flat water tariff fee is considered affordable (World Bank, 2010), the minimum quantity is 
fixed and may still prove taxing for some. A fixed tariff means that low-income users will 
have to spend a larger portion of their income on securing water in comparison to more 
affluent users. Subsidies for deprived households do not exist, and the official policy 
states that users who fail to pay the annual fee are disconnected from the public 
network. With over half the population in Tripoli identified as deprived (Nehmeh, 2010), 
water affordability becomes jeopardized. 
Low-income households are also more vulnerable than their affluent counterparts 
to the intermittence of water supply, which involves multiple layers of injustices. As 
mentioned earlier, the World Bank considers the expenditure on water for connected 
households to be considered affordable, such that it is within the water expenditure 
affordability threshold identified as 5% of the total household budget (World Bank, 2010). 
The intermittent public water supply, however, which tends to be least reliable in 
 
 
 60 
deprived communities, compromises the ability of socio-economically disadvantaged 
individuals to access water. This means that they have to either purchase expensive 
private water they cannot afford, or go through other forms of hardship in pursuit of 
securing water. The overdependence of low-income households on unregulated private 
sources or the unsafe storage of water further increases their vulnerability to consuming 
contaminated water. Moreover, in cases of being affected by waterborne diseases, 
poorer individuals lack the socio-economic means to seek appropriate healthcare.  
Water shortage is also partly associated with the ongoing rationing of electricity. 
Since electric pumps are used to fill roof tanks with water, the daily electricity rationing 
that lasts for several hours at a time temporarily disables the pumps and so the tanks 
are not refilled once emptied. Households without subscriptions to private electric 
generators may run out of water during the periods of no electricity if the tanks are 
emptied too soon, and thus need to be more careful about their water consumption. 
Since low-income households are unable to afford the expensive subscription to private 
electric generators to compensate for the chronic electricity rationing, their ability to 
access water is further undermined. Other forms of hardship come from having to 
negotiate with neighbours or carry water from public fountains. As Makdisi (2007) 
indicates, deprived urban suburbs suffer “severe deprivation” of access to water (p. 378). 
3.7 Neighbourhoods	Suffering	from	Water	shortage	–	Coping	Strategies	
Despite the illegality of discrimination in the Lebanese constitution, inequitable access 
to water is evident, and is part of a larger-scale discriminatory system characterized by 
uneven regional development (Makdisi, 2007). Within Tripoli, discrimination in water 
access largely affects poorer populations and those without a legal status. Areas that 
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suffer from water shortage in Tripoli include the suburbs of Abou Samra and Qobbeh, 
both considered impoverished (Nehmeh, 2010). The elevated geographical location of 
both suburbs, and the fact that they are located in the extremities of the system, 
introduces technical difficulties that compromise the quality of service delivery, such as 
low pressure of delivered water (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).  
Additionally, Palestinian refugees in the Baddawi camp in Tripoli, like all 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, are denied civil and social rights as they continue to 
live in apartheid after six decades of their forced displacement from Palestine. 
Established in 1955, the Baddawi camp lies five Km North of Tripoli’s centre, and today 
hosts around 30,000 individuals who lack access to all kinds of public services including 
water (UNRWA, n.d.). Instead, the residents of this camp rely on the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to obtain 
basic services.  
 
NGO representatives who are directly involved in water service provision report 
that some of the ways in which residents in marginalized areas cope with the chronic 
water shortage include storing water in containers or roof tanks (usually installed by 
NGOs under the umbrella of WASH), carrying water from Hawuz (public fountains), or 
by negotiating with neighbours who may have access to private wells (C. Nachabe, S. 
AbdulRahman, and O. Assad, personal communication, 2016). In Qobbeh, for example, 
many households use municipal water points to obtain their drinking water (ACTED, 
2012). In some instances, residents obtain water through the illegal tapping into 
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groundwater or the public network (Darwish, 2004). In the case of Palestinian refugee 
camps, the UNRWA takes care of water provision and infrastructure (Makdisi, 2007). 
4 The	Right	to	Water:	Findings	and	Analysis		
The following subsections capture the perspectives of my research participants, and 
other sources of data, on what the right to water means and their opinions on the 
engagement of citizens in policymaking. The discussions should give the reader an idea 
of the kinds of discourse specific to this case study, and reflect the general 
understandings that shape widespread beliefs. Where applicable, I categorize the 
discussions according to the occupation of participants (i.e. government officials, water 
professionals, and NGO representatives). No discussion of citizens’ perspective on the 
right to water exists in the upcoming analysis, since the interviews I conducted with this 
particular category were too few to yield sound conclusions. I conclude with a brief note 
on a previous initiative for public engagement in Tripoli: the Friends of Water 
Association.  
4.1 Perspectives	on	the	‘Right	to	Water’		
Although the right to water is theoretically well accepted by governmental officials, 
experts, and authority figures, it is mainly understood in the neoliberal sense. The ‘right 
to water’ has been used to promote an agenda of neoliberalizing the water sector by 
involving the private sector. Evidence of this is found in governmental documents, 
internationally-prepared reports, and privatization promotion material (CIH, 2013; MoEW, 
2012; North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). For instance, the National Water 
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Sector Strategy (NWSS) proposed by the MoEW portrays water in its slogan as “a right 
for every citizen, a resource for the whole country” (MoEW, 2012).  
Among research participants, the belief in water as a human right seems to be 
unquestionable and taken for granted. In fact, the majority of research participants 
pondered over the intent of the question about what the right to water means. The 
majority gave similar answers: that water is vital to life, the source of all living beings, 
and thus is fundamentally a basic right that long predates its recognition by the UN. 
Chadi Nachabe, president of Utopia, described the right to water as “very basic, and as 
important as the right to live in dignity, to eat, and to play” (personal communication, 
2016)). Nasser Nasrallah, president of Ibrahim Abd Al-Al Foundation, further stated: 
The right to water is sacred, and this is true for all religions. Water should not be 
available and accessible only to those who could afford it. You can't let people 
die of thirst just because they are not able to pay. The UN acknowledged this 
right in terms of the right to a fixed quantity, but this is an inevitable thing; the 
right to water is as old as life itself (personal communication, 2016).  
 
Despite the general acceptance of access to water as a fundamental right, 
perceptions of what this right actually means and how it can be achieved varied among 
participants. The dominant understanding of the right to water is one that entitles 
citizens to a certain quantity of clean water to cover their basic needs. The participants’ 
initial response about what the right to water might entail revolved around access to 
sufficient quantities of clean and safe water at an affordable cost. Hayek, for instance, 
articulated his perception of the right to water as ensuring universal coverage, whether it 
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be through governmental or private sector coverage (personal communication, 2016). 
While mainstream perception of the right to water as the right to a fixed quantity is 
clearly prevalent in the Lebanese context, specific numbers about how much this 
minimum amount should be and affordability criteria seem to exist in expert documents 
only.  
Sometimes talking about the right to water was framed in relation to responsibility. 
Discussions about the meaning of the right to water were accompanied by discussing 
(a) the government’s responsibility to secure water, and (b) citizens’ responsibility to 
conserve water. This discourse was especially noticeable among government officials, 
water experts, previous members of the Friends of Water Association, and 
representatives from the DAI NGO. One representative of the public sector 
communicated her understanding of the right to water as the WE’s responsibility to 
serve citizens: “Our job is to make this water available” (D.S., personal communication, 
2016). Indeed, water on North Lebanon WE’s informational pamphlets is recognized as 
a “right for every citizen” (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). Furthermore, 
“securing water is a shared responsibility” such that it is the WE’s responsibility to 
secure and deliver water to subscribers, after which it becomes the responsibility of the 
subscriber to ensure the conservation of this water and its protection from pollution 
(North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). As a civil society member notes, “securing 
water should be the responsibility of the government, but conserving water should be 
observed by citizens” (K.S., personal communication, 2016).  
On the same note, the justice in “water justice” elicited answers related to the 
current structure of the tariff system, suggesting that the right to water, i.e. water justice, 
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can be achieved through establishing a consumption-based tariff structure and the 
installation of meters to monitor usage and induce conservation. Furthermore, As Saliba, 
the Private Sector Engagement Team Leader of the LWP at DAI, put it, a small 
proportion of people consume the majority of water. With the flat fee currently 
implemented, everyone is treated equally (or unequally in this case) regardless of 
consumption habits or socio-economic conditions. The current lump sum fee resembles 
flat taxes on basic goods, which targets the poor rather than the rich; in effect, the poor 
are subsidizing affluent consumers (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). One 
way to address water inequities is through social tariff, that is, government subsidies 
based on socio-economic needs (Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). Indeed, 
many participants believe that applying a consumption-based tariff, complemented with 
the installation of monitoring meters, while providing a minimum amount of water for 
free would help to address the right to water (H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; M. Tahsaldar; S. 
Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Roland Riachi, a political ecologist, believes 
that water is a human right and the state should satisfy the need of every citizen for 
water at little or no cost (Lebanese Economic Association & Friedrich Nauman Stiftung 
Für Die Freiheit, 2016). Jalal Halawani, a water professional, identified the minimum 
amount that should be supplied for free as equal to 50 L/person/day. 
Overall, the majority of participants disagreed with the current tariff structure and 
thought it unjust, with the exception of D.S, and employee at North Lebanon WE. 
Although D.S. concurred that the current minimum amount of tariff is too large, she 
believed it is reasonable and barely covers the WE’s expenses associated with water 
treatment, maintenance, operation, and delivery. The financial deficit is also the result of 
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illegal connections to the public network and the low rate of fee collection, reported as 
10% across Lebanon in the early 2000s (Makdisi, 2007). The World Bank (2012) 
reported a higher collection rate, estimated at 47% at the national level in 2010. In 
Tripoli, the rate of fee collection improved with Ondeo’s PPP (World Bank, 2012), 
reaching 55% after the contract had terminated (Allès, 2012). D.S. claimed that the 
problem lies not in the tariff but in the lack of public trust in the WE services. A few 
participants also complained about the prevalent misunderstanding among citizens in 
regards to the tariff and the resulting uncooperative attitudes (D.S.; G. Akl; J. Halawani; 
K.S., personal communication, 2016). The misconception has to do with people’s 
expectations around the cost of water such that – in the opinion of governmental 
officials and NGO representatives – people expect water to be completely free since it is 
a basic human right. The participants emphasized the need to correct this view such 
that water itself is indeed free but people need to pay for maintenance and operational 
costs of water infrastructure (D.S.; G. Akl; J. Halawani; K.S., personal communication, 
2016). 
 
In sum, it would seem that interpretations of the right to water align with the 
neoliberal view, where granting the right to water for every citizen is best achieved 
through promoting conservation, reforming the current tariff structure, or involving the 
private sector. In many cases, the right to water was seen as inseparable from users’ 
responsibility to conserve. In addition, terms such as “customers” or “consumers” were 
repeatedly used to refer to the users of the public network (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; 
K.S., personal communication, 2016). On more than one occasion, citizens informally 
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referred to the WE as the Water Corporation, although the WE is a not-for-profit public 
establishment. 
4.2 Discourse	of	Water	Scarcity,	Technical	Solutions	and	Privatization	
In alignment with neoliberal perspectives, discussions of the right to water often take 
place in relation to a discourse of scarcity and technical fixes. Notably, this is a 
perspective that is amenable to the involvement of private capital in water supply 
solutions.  
Participants concurred that water supply in Tripoli is one of the best in the 
country but they also shared concerns about a prospective water shortage. A discourse 
of water scarcity due to climate change, population growth, increasing demand due to 
the influx of Syrian refugees, aging infrastructure, and unsustainable consumption is 
dominant among representatives of the public sector and NGOs. As one participant 
mentioned: “We are completely to run out of water by 2070. If we don’t conserve water 
now we won’t find any in the future” (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). Another 
water professional commented that Tripoli has no water scarcity problems at the 
present time, but issues will arise 10 years from now when groundwater resources are 
depleted (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Participants see the solution to 
water scarcity through the promotion of conservation, protection against pollution, water 
harnessing through dams, a consumption-based tariff, effective management, and 
rehabilitating the water infrastructure (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; K.S., personal 
communication, 2016).  
Echoes of the conservation discourse are also found in governmental leaflets. 
For instance, the informational pamphlets distributed by the WE portray water 
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conservation as the insurance against future shortage (North Lebanon Water 
Establishment, 2014). Slogans such as “Conserve a little, so that enough water shall 
remain for every neighbourhood” are used on pamphlets that promote water 
conservation through encouraging the alteration of water use habits and the adoption of 
water-conserving technologies (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2014). It is worth 
noting that these brochures have been produced in collaboration with international 
agencies. While raising awareness about wise consumption is critical, it fails to address 
the root causes underlying water shortage.  
Finally, it is crucial to note the way these preceding framings of water challenges 
leave an opening for the right to water to be taken up as part of pressures for water 
privatization. For instance, Ziad Hayek believes that the involvement of the private 
sector through PPPs is one way for achieving universal coverage of water needs and 
thus addressing the right to water (personal communication, 2016). In one key example, 
the compatibility of the ‘right to water’ with privatization is manifest in the Blue Gold 
project. As part of Blue Gold’s promotional campaign, its proponents employ the ‘right to 
water’ to attract supporters (CIH, 2013). In this case, the ‘right to water’ is used to 
reinforce the neoliberal agenda. Rania Masri, an academic researcher, believes that the 
initiative advances a hidden agenda of privatizing the water sector (R. Masri, personal 
communication, 2016). So do the journalists Firas Abou-Mosleh (2014) and Ward 
Abdallah (2015). The former describes the Blue Gold as a “deceitful plan to commodify 
water in Lebanon”, and the latter accuses it of planning to transform water from being a 
natural right for citizens to a commodity subjected to the risk of monopoly. It is 
interesting to note that Abdalla (2015) supports water harvesting through dam 
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construction as one possible solution to the manifold water problems. By denouncing 
Blue Gold yet approving of dam construction, Abdalla demonstrates some of the further 
ambiguities in the way the right to water can enter political discourse.  
What all of the preceding discursive uses of the right to water close off is a 
discussion of what Lebanese political ecologists have emphasized: the economic and 
political power structures that are the root cause of water injustices (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014; 
Masri, 2015). While some attribute the water crisis to both climatic factors and failed 
management, they, unlike mainstream experts, refute the appropriateness of dams in 
the case of Lebanon for several reasons.13 Such perspectives are uncommon in public 
discourse, with technocratic fixes clearly dominating mainstream perception of water 
supply solutions in the Lebanese context. In raising this distinction, my aim is by no 
means to underestimate the challenges posed by climate change or to dismiss the 
importance of water conservation. Rather, I aim to emphasize the need to move beyond 
the simplistic interpretation of water shortage as “natural” towards addressing – and 
challenging – the power relations underlying physical scarcity.  
4.3 Public	Engagement	and	the	Right	to	Participate	in	Policymaking	
The process of policymaking in Lebanon is enveloped with a lack of transparency, a 
politics of secrecy, and the absence of information dissemination to the public—in short, 
a reluctance to engage citizens. Policies are not posted online and obtaining access to 
                                            
13  Roland Riachi attributed the infeasibility of dam construction in Lebanon to the karstic 
limestone nature of Lebanon’s geology, which results in high volumes of infiltration, the nature 
of Lebanon’s deep valleys such that higher walls are needed to retain small amounts of water, 
high costs, uncertain feasibility, and the seismic faults underlying Lebanon’s topography makes 
dam building a risky undertaking (Lebanese Economic Association & Friedrich Nauman Stiftung 
Für Die Freiheit, 2016).  
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government documents is extremely difficult. The case of water is no exception to this 
tendency, and Makdisi’s (2007) comment on the lack of available data on water usage 
and the status of water resources remains true today. This is partly a problem of 
transparency, and partly a result of the fact that much important water data is never 
collected in the first place (Darwish, 2004; Makdisi, 2007). The result of this lack of 
information is a public lack of trust in government, and by extension in the water supply 
system. Unfortunately, this lack of trust is reciprocal, where public discussions of water 
issues are perceived as a threat to the reputation of the government and thus 
discouraged (Darwish, 2004). Overall, access to information remains difficult as secrecy 
surrounds the making of policy (Darwish, 2004). Even in cases where initiatives aim to 
encourage citizen participation, the latter has been reduced to mere feedback on 
completed plans, as was the case in the Ondeo PPP (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). One of the 
objectives of the project was the promotion of the participation of “customers”, facilitated 
through establishing a customer desk to directly receive people’s complaints without 
resorting to local leaders who act as intermediaries (Allès, 2012). The same is true for 
the 2000 reform, which limited “the consultation of the national water strategy to a select 
group of public officials, international donors and hand-picked civil society members 
involved with technical expertise rather than social concerns” (Makdisi, 2007, p. 377). 
When prompted as to whether the right to water should also entail the right to 
participate in policymaking, participants in the research had conflicting opinions. Some 
strongly endorsed the involvement of civil society in the decision-making process, while 
others opposed. The opinions of the rest of the interviewees were somewhere in 
between, with the majority approving of the cautious and strategic involvement of the 
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public. Overall, I found that the opinions of participants with respect to the engagement 
of the public and civil society did not depend on their occupations. The following 
subsections breakdown the opinions of participants according to occupation. 
4.3.1 Perspective	of	Government	Officials	and	Water	Professionals		
Ziad Hayek, Secretary General of the Higher Council of Privatization, supported citizen 
involvement only insofar as to correct misconceptions about tariff payment (i.e. that it 
covers the cost of extraction, treatment, maintenance, and distribution rather than the 
cost of the water itself), and to raise awareness about the need for conservation (Z. 
Hayek, personal communication, 2016). On the other hand, he deemed the process of 
policymaking too complicated to involve citizens, particularly where PPP is the subject 
of interest. PPP, Hayek believes, is a complex and controversial concept that people 
generally misunderstand as absolute privatization, which is generally perceived as 
incompatible with the notion that water is a right and should, therefore, be free. Since 
the general public lacks the necessary information needed to make informed decisions 
about PPPs, for instance, what is needed instead is “policymakers making responsible 
decisions” (Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). Maher Tahsaldar, head of the 
accounting department at the North Lebanon WE and faculty at the Lebanese University, 
supported the participation of citizens in policymaking, but indicated the need to first 
clarify important concepts pertaining to the nature of water—whether it is a public, 
private, or community good. For instance, a community governance scheme that follows 
Ostrom’s model cannot take place in cases where water is considered a public or a 
private good (M. Tahsaldar, personal communication, 2016). In Tahsaldar’s words: “If 
we were to use Ostrom’s model for example, where water is governed by the 
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community, it is not possible for a community to govern a public or a private good. This 
is the problem”. Another employee at the North Lebanon WE showed cautious 
openness to the opinions of citizens, but thought it infeasible to involve citizens in every 
decisions because there are certain institutional procedures that need to be respected 
(D.S., personal communication, 2016). 
When asked about the willingness of the government to consider the opinions of 
citizens or civil society members in the decision-making process, Tahsaldar responded 
that the government is not receptive at all as individuals in power do not believe in 
sharing with the people; he attributed this to the failure in management and 
administration. J. Halawani shared the same opinion about the unwillingness of 
policymakers to acknowledge the rights of citizens or civil society actors to participate in 
decisions around water governance. Saliba indicated that the process is “at an 
embryonic stage” as “engaging the public is a risk the government is unwilling to take” 
(S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). 
Nevertheless, D.S., the employee at North Lebanon WE, reported the recent 
launch of an initiative undertaken by the North Lebanon WE in the district of Bcharri. 
The project aims to consult with citizens in regards to a directive blueprint for 
wastewater by bringing together local farmers, citizens, municipal members, and 
entrepreneurs (D.S., personal communication, 2016). Assessments of the project are 
unavailable yet as it is still in its early stages. 
4.3.2 Perspective	of	NGOs	and	Activists	
Perhaps surprisingly, opinions among NGOs and activists were quite divergent, with 
only a few speaking strongly in favour of robust citizen engagement in water policy 
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making. Some representatives of NGOs and community members showed scepticism 
towards the involvement of citizens in decision-making. “Decisions”, as a previous 
member of the Friends of Water group stated, “should be left to the experts”, while 
citizens must be “educated” or “made aware” of the vices of wasteful consumption (K.S., 
personal communication, 2016). On the other end of the spectrum, the activists Hosn 
Khalaf and A.A. strongly supported the engagement of citizens in policymaking. Khalaf 
further saw the ideal situation as one where the public sector, private sector, and civil 
society collaborated together. Also, representatives of Utopia, an NGO that advocates 
for social justice and undertakes small-scale water provision projects in Tripoli (see 
section 4 in Appendix C), endorsed a democratic approach to water governance, 
emphasizing that “the process of policy-making should be participatory” and confirming 
the need for collaboration between the public sector, private sector, and communities (C. 
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016).  
Ali Darwish, President of Green Line, and Nasser Nasrallah, President of Ibrahim 
Abd Al-Al Foundation, had a more cautious approach and suggested that engaging 
citizens should happen through their elected representatives. Ali Darwish believes that it 
is infeasible to consult with the public on every single decision since their rights are 
already accounted for via elections (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). 
However, there should be space in municipal meetings where public audiences can 
participate (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Salah Saliba and George Akl, 
representatives of DAI, acknowledged the importance of involving civil society and 
citizens in general, but also cautioned that the latter may be unprepared for this kind of 
engagement as they lack the necessary knowledge of water issues (G. Akl and S. 
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Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Nevertheless, DAI works on engaging civil 
society along with the government and the private sector as part of the NGO’s work on 
water problems that are caused by inefficient markets and incompetent governance 
(DAI, n.d.).  
Given these ambiguous views about citizen involvement from within civil society 
organizations, it should perhaps come at no surprise that there is a general absence of 
advocacy for improved water access, and a scarcity of NGOs that work on water issues 
outside the framework of water provision. Even this latter kind of work fell out of favour 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Darwish, 2004), but was taken up again after the 
outbreak of the Syrian war due to the increasing demand (C. Nachabe, personal 
communication, 2016). Several Western-based NGOs have acted as service providers 
to compensate for the inadequacy of the state, by installing water facilities and 
establishing connections in underserved areas (ACTED, 2012). Additionally, several 
local NGOs, e.g. Utopia, have partnered with international agencies for the same 
purpose, and continue to rely on international funding to support the development of 
water projects in neighbourhoods undergoing armed conflict. From a human rights 
perspective, though, the right to water is currently not on any organization’s agenda (C. 
Nachabe; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).  
4.3.3 Friends	of	Water	Association		
To highlight the difficulties surrounding the relationship between the government and 
civil society, it is worth examining one particular failed strategy for greater public 
engagement. In 2009, the Friends of Water Association (FWA) emerged out of the 
collaboration between the North Lebanon WE and the French agency Rhône Alpes (H. 
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Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). The aim of the top-down initiative was to bridge 
the gap between the WE and citizens in hopes of repairing the WE’s tarnished 
reputation by engaging members of the civil society. The main goal of the FWA, as 
indicated by Hosn Khalaf and K.S., both previous members of the initiative, was to 
educate citizens about the merits of water conservation (H. Khalaf and K.S., personal 
communication, 2016). It is notable that being educated was the extent of citizen 
involvement invisioned for the initiative. Moreover, the civil activists were selected by 
the organization. After completing several training workshops about water facilities in 
the north, treatment plants, effective communication, etc., the activists were unable to 
undertake their assigned tasks of raising awareness among citizens due to tensions 
between the WE and the FWA; the committee eventually split up, and the association 
was discontinued (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016).  
Hosn Khalaf, blamed the failure of the initiative on the uncooperative behavior of 
the WE authorities, who strived to maintain control and protect their status by 
disempowering the selected activists. In her opinion, governmental authorities felt 
threatened by an empowered, well-educated civil society and thus were apprehensive 
of potential conflicts over power (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). On the 
other hand, K.S. gave no particular reason for the termination of the initiative, but 
indicated the lack of communication between the WE and the public as one possibility 
(K.S., personal communication, 2016). Jalal Halawani, Head of the Department of 
Public Health and Environment at the Lebanese University and training professional for 
the FWA, questioned whether members in the initiative had sufficient access to 
resources, and suggested this might be a reason for its failure. Finally, D.S., employee 
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at the North Lebanon WE, attributed the failure of the initiative to the lack of capacity in 
finance and human resources at the WE, such that no single employee could be 
dedicated to oversee the project (personal communication, 2016).  
Whether it be lack of political will or lack of logistics, a meaningful relationship 
between the government and the public is clearly absent. Corruption, clientelism, 
struggle for power, and the lack of trust between the government and citizens persist, 
hindering the success of water reform initiatives and putting any hopes of democratic 
water policy processes at a considerable distance. 
5 Conclusion	
Lebanon suffers from a complex series of water problems, manifest in the intermittent 
supply and poor water quality. While Tripoli is doing better than most other regions, 
water accessibility and affordability is still a widespread issue. Lack of access to water 
reveals, and is connected to, various forms of hardship that most adversely affect the 
vulnerable segments of society, who carry a heavier burden of water shortage. The 
dissatisfaction of citizens with the performance of the public sector has opened the door 
to the increased involvement of the private sector, as the majority of the population get 
their drinking water via alternative means. 
While there is political acknowledgement of water problems, they are mainly 
articulated from the neoliberal perspective, often attributed to climate change, 
unsustainable consumption, population growth, weak institutions, and ineffective 
management. These are to be addressed through increased water harvesting, 
infrastructure rehabilitation, conservation promotion and education, institutional reforms, 
and the careful involvement of the private sector.  
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The problems of the water sector, however, should be understood as socio-
spatial inequalities inherent to the complex political makeup of Lebanon that is mainly 
characterized by clientelism, corruption, and sectarian territorialisation of power. "All 
water problems are inherently political”, thus “requiring a political process for solution" 
(Naff, 2009, p. 39). Given this and the several failed reformative initiatives, it can be 
predicted that any superficial treatment of water issues in the existence of the current 
political infrastructure is doomed to fail.  
Faced with this context, the right to water plays an ambiguous role. Although the 
right to water has existed since ancient times and is politically and socially well 
accepted, it is mainly understood in the neoliberal sense: as access to a basic amount 
of safe water. Yet even this humble goal remains unachieved. Inevitably, the 
democratization of water policymaking is alien in this context. On a political level, the 
right to water is rarely politicized, as there is a scarcity of NGOs and other forms of civil 
society that work on water from a political standpoint. Even when the right to water is 
employed, it is not incompatible with the mainstream neoliberal agenda such that both 
proponents and opponents of privatization use the right to water ambiguously to 
advance conflicting goals.  Aside from the occasional sparse voices that advocate for 
the right to water every now and then, mobilizations around water issues are almost 
non-existent.
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Chapter	IV:	Agency	and	Social	Mobilization	
1 Introduction	
The literature on environmental justice seeks to understand the origins and dynamics of 
socio-environmental advocacy around the world. While this literature helps us 
understand why mobilizations occur, it does not address as extensively the question of 
why and how such mobilizations are sometimes absent even when environmental 
injustice is clearly present. Given that water problems, specifically intermittent supply, 
compel the majority of citizens to seek alternative sources in the case of Tripoli, and of 
Lebanon in general, we might expect to see the right to water taken up by social 
movements and civil society organizations (CSOs), as we do in other parts of the world. 
Yet this study has found instead that the discourse around the right to water is only 
weakly present and has a rather ambiguous political impact in the context of Tripoli. 
How can this be explained? What are the limitations to political agency for marginalized 
populations, and what kinds of considerations shape the approach of civil society 
working on water issues in the country? And why has Tripoli not seen citizens take to 
the streets as they have in other parts of the world? 
The absence of water advocacy might suggest that water injustices do not exist. 
Yet this is clearly not the case as demonstrated in Chapter III. In the present chapter I 
explore various explanations for these findings. Developing these explanations requires 
a better understanding of the dynamics of activism and the role of civil society14 in 
enacting mass mobilizations to address social and environmental injustices. I argue that 
                                            
14 For this research, I delimit civil society as “the place where a mélange of groups, associations, 
clubs, guilds, and groups [sic] come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen” 
(Augustus Richard Norton, cited in Yom, 2005, p. 18).  
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even though social agency around water is largely absent within citizens’ interactions 
with government, and does not take the form of mass mobilization in Tripoli, it does 
exist through invisible coping strategies and alternate networks. To set the stage for 
pursuing this argument, I first sketch out the regional historical processes of 
modernization and colonialism that led to changes in the social order throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries, shaping the context for contemporary social mobilization.  
The chapter starts with an overview of social mobilization within the Arab World. I 
then narrow my focus to study this phenomenon in Tripoli, Lebanon, focusing on the 
role of select Lebanese CSOs15 that advocate for various issues of social justice. As I 
pursue an answer to the question of why water justice advocacy seems relatively 
absent from Tripoli, I discuss those CSOs with a few specific issues and questions in 
mind. For a start, I am interested in the extent of their involvement with citizens, and 
thus their potential in establishing a strong mobilizing foundation and advocacy network. 
Second, given my focus on linked questions of social and environmental justice, I query 
the role of CSOs in challenging systemic oppressions that are embedded in the socio-
political structure in place. Finally, I turn my attention towards the broader landscape 
within which CSOs operate to investigate the challenges we find there that impede 
progress towards democratizing policymaking and increasing citizen participation in 
political life. 
                                            
15 CSOs are only one part of what can be considered mass mobilization, but they are key points 
of articulation that can help us understand the broader landscape of civil society. Nevertheless, 
some of my exploration of the case study will draw in other elements, such as activist networks. 
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2 Historical	Context:	Overview	of	Arab	Social	Movements	
To better understand the dynamics of contemporary social mobilization, it is worthwhile 
to first sketch out the regional historical processes of modernization and colonialism that 
led to changes in the social order throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. 
2.1 Origins	and	Evolution	of	Civil	Society	in	the	Arab	World	
Up to the early 1900s, communities under the Ottoman reign were essentially self-
governing for most matters. A study by Abraham Marcus (1992) describes the pre-
modern Middle Eastern cities as consisting of active, localized, and organic 
communities that provided the backbone of social welfare independently from a central 
state. Only transboundary security affairs, the judicial system, and large-scale 
infrastructure projects fell to higher authorities. The forms of civil society that existed at 
the time included kin-based associations, professional and trade groups, charity 
organizations, as well as self-regulated committees and institutions that managed 
financial affairs. Charitable trusts, the waqf, covered the majority of expenses falling to 
public government in the West. 
This decentralized social governance meant that local leaders, tribal chiefs, 
religious and ethnic figures, or familial notables (depending on the societal structure in 
place) were the first point of contact with commoners, often endeavouring to provide 
services, resolve local conflicts, and even challenge Ottoman decrees when they had 
impacts on local well-being (Marcus, 1992). These influential figures essentially acted 
as intermediaries between the community and authorities. The resulting multi-scale 
interaction between the different networks that made up the societal fabric gave 
communities pathways for mobilizing to express social discontent. While community ties 
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have weakened over the time, they continue to represent an important avenue for social 
support.   
The pre-existing social order started to disintegrate with the era of modernity and 
as a result of the wave of colonization that swept over the Middle East on the verge of 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the pre-existent guilds, charities, and 
familial groups, new classes of society emerged such as trade unions and student 
associations (Ibrahim, 1998). The social reformation based on the fusion of old localized 
networks with emergent classes gave way to the birth of modern NGOs, first appearing 
in Egypt and the Levant in the early 19th century, and often linked to anti-colonial 
grassroots movements (Ibrahim, 1998). These movements, and the associated revolts 
against imperial powers, were repressed during the consolidation of French and British 
control in the region in the latter part of the 19th and first part of the 20th centuries. 
Nevertheless, they subsequently grew in importance, and with the eventual end of 
colonialism in the mid 20th century, many of those who were active in civil society 
organizations and struggles for independence took up roles in government. Though this 
originally made for a friendly political environment for NGOs, populist regimes that 
emerged in parts of the Arab World in many cases led to authoritarian, reduced 
freedoms and a diminished civil society (Ibrahim, 1998). The authoritarian state 
replaced pre-existing forms of community associations, acting instead as the sole 
provider of social benefits in return for citizens’ loyalty.  
It should be noted that political process in Lebanon unfolded somewhat 
differently, largely to the benefit of civil society. Post-colonial Lebanon enjoyed a relative 
degree of political freedom in comparison to neighbouring states, especially prior to the 
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direct involvement of the Syrian regime in Lebanese affairs. Thus, Lebanese civil 
society did not undergo the same pressures as its counterparts elsewhere. Additionally, 
the civil war and successive political unrest since 1975 rendered the state dysfunctional, 
a condition that forced civil society to take the lead and resulted in the emergence of 
other kinds of social support. In fact, many of the combatant militias themselves took on 
the role of service provision within districts under their control (Aghina, 2015). The 
resulting social and political order features various kinds of networks, including patron-
client relations, which have in turn played a major role in shaping contemporary civil 
society in Lebanon. These social and political networks were transformed again in the 
late 20th century with the global advent of neoliberal ideology. The following section 
treats this transformation in the broader context of a re-emergent civil society in the 
Arab world. 
2.2 Re-emergence	of	Arab	Civil	Society	
Civil society in the Arab world regained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, given a 
few transformational factors. The role of the state as the main provider of benefits such 
as education, housing, health, food and fuel subsidies, and so on (Bayat, 2002), 
retreated in favour of the private sector and free market, as most Arab states adopted 
liberal economic policies during and after the 1980s (Yom, 2005). At the same time, the 
region had been experiencing population growth, increase in income disparity and 
poverty rates, and rapid urban expansion, hence necessitating alternative means of 
meeting social needs (Asfari Institute, 2016). In tandem, international institutions and 
NGOs began to promote the notion that civil society is a precondition for the transition 
towards democracy in countries governed by the tight grip of authoritarian regimes 
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(Yom, 2005). Voluntary associations that maintained independence from both the state 
and familial affiliations were seen as the pathway to challenging oppressive structures 
and gaining civil liberties (Yom, 2005). The transformations that resulted from the 
globalization of neoliberalism and human rights ideals opened "new spaces for social 
mobilization" (Bayat, 2002, p. 2).  
Early responses to neoliberal shifts took the form of mass protests. One example 
was the mass demonstration in Beirut in 1987 against the drop in value of the Lebanese 
currency (Bayat, 2002). Bayat asserts that such mobilizations were merely a response 
to major events of rare occurrence and scale, and hence inconsequential in terms of 
generating lasting political change. Indeed, people resorted once again to social ties, 
still relatively strong, to obtain services and supports not provided by the state in the 
context of the economic crisis. Instead, Bayat (2002) emphasizes other kinds of 
activism as more prominent: community activism, Islamic social movements, and what 
he calls “quiet encroachment” (p. 19). The latter he defines as the form of support that 
people obtain, often illegally, through social networks and alternate safety nets. As we 
will see in section 3.2.3, it is this form of agency that predominates in Tripoli today. 
Movements related to environmental justice are not widely documented as part of 
this growth of modern Arab civil society. One example discussed by Bayat (2002) is that 
of a grassroots movement in a small, socio-economically marginal Egyptian community 
that protested the pollution caused by local smelters. Another similar environmental 
movement, described by one environmentalist as the “first environmental intifada” 
(uprising) in the Arab world, took place in Hay al-Sollum in Beirut in 1997 to denounce a 
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polluting incinerator in the neighbourhood (Kingston, 2001, p. 60, emphasis in original). 
No other cases of similar nature are reported in the scholarly literature.  
2.2.1 Arab	Civil	Society	and	Democracy	
Despite the widespread contributions of CSOs to democratization in different parts of 
the world, CSOs in the Arab world have produced more mixed results. Yom (2005) goes 
farther to argue that Arab CSOs have essentially failed to spark democratic change, 
despite the enormous financial support that local organizations received from the 
international community. Arab societies have been dominated by stubborn and 
persistent autocratic regimes that Yom (2005) describes as “exceptional” in the world (p. 
16). The capacity of CSOs to foster greater public participation in political decisions, 
such as involvement in the making of water policies, depends on a number of factors, 
including relationships with the state, the internal structure of the CSOs themselves, 
public responses to civil society action, and patron-client networks.  
The latter is especially central in the case of Lebanon where patron-client 
relations work on multiple levels. First, they permeate people’s lives by compelling them 
to seek services through local leaders. In turn, the latter’s status is reinforced. Second, 
clientelism shapes the interaction of civil society with citizens and limits its potential 
such that within a patron-client framework, the role of civil society is reduced to 
“expand[ing] the scope of clientelist exchanges” (Kingston, 2001, p. 57). In some cases, 
Kingston argues, civil society organizations themselves get absorbed into the patron-
client framework.  
The following case study of Tripoli explores these factors in more detail, 
occasionally broadening the analysis to a national scale in order to round out the 
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explanatory narrative. Bearing in mind the relative lack of mass mobilizations in general, 
and ones related to the ‘right to water’ in particular, I also delve into the role of activist 
networks. My intent is to illustrate the dynamics of social and political mobilizations in 
order to explore the potential for grassroots endeavours to break through prevalent 
patron-client relations and effect real change. Throughout this exploration, I chart where 
the ‘right to water’ fits on the map of rising struggles, consider explanations for its 
absence, and highlight other forms of agency. 
3 Case	Study:	Tripoli,	Lebanon	
Tripoli is situated within a political landscape that is divided along sectarian lines, where 
division of power and resources happens according to certain political arrangements 
and sectarian quotas. For although the political structure in Lebanon is considered 
constitutional democracy, actual power operates through "informal networks" that are 
controlled by "sectarian elites" (Kingston, 2001, p. 57). Instead of the typical state-
citizen model found elsewhere, the patron-client model dominates Lebanese socio-
political structure and transcends people’s daily lives. This system of patronage exists 
within a locally territorialized structure organized on a sectarian basis. 
Accordingly, each leader provides for his clients, who most often belong to the 
same sect as the leader (Makdisi, 2007; Lefevre, 2014; Eid-Sabbagh. 2014). Yet “the 
issue with Tripoli”, in addition to its neglect by the state, “is that it has many leaders but 
lacks leadership” as one political figure notes (cited in Lefévre, 2014, p. 8). In this 
vacuum, Patron-client relations continue to dominate access to resources. Furthermore, 
service provision has been transformed through the struggle over power into “a privately 
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contested terrain” that has turned even “municipal authority into an extension of these 
struggles” (Information International SAL, 2001, p. 86). 
3.1 Overview	of	Advocacy	Networks	and	Campaigns	
Citizen mobilizations in the post-civil war era have rallied along the lines of political and 
sectarian affiliations, where political leaders (zu’ama) usually recruit the masses to 
advance political agendas. Recently, however, a few timid mobilizations with social or 
environmental justice orientations have taken place. Extremely unusual in the context of 
post-war Lebanon, these movements were not tainted by sectarianism, but started as 
non-partisan (Kassir, 2015). Two major themes stand out: advocacy for public spaces 
and the demand for a resolution to the waste crisis.  
3.1.1 Advocacy	for	Public	Spaces	
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of new advocacy networks that have 
adopted social justice issues. The networks vary in type: some are official NGOs, such 
as Donia for Sustainable Development, and Nahnoo (in Beirut); some are coalitions, 
such as the Committee for Monitoring Tripoli’s Projects; and others are unofficial 
networks, such as the Civic Mobilization Network (see Appendix C for more information 
about each group). These networks have launched several campaigns to advocate for a 
variety of social issues, most prominently public spaces.  
One such campaign is Our Sea, Our Land (see Appendix D, section 1 for more 
details) that calls for the protection of public properties on the sea front in Tripoli against 
the multiple illegal transgressions of public space. The campaign was launched by 
Donia, headed by Nariman Shamaa, and supported by the Civic Mobilization Network, 
led by Samer Annous. Other similar campaigns include the Underground Garage in 
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Tripoli, which consisted of a coalition of activist networks to oppose the construction of 
an underground garage that was to take place at the centre of Tripoli; and Horsh Beirut, 
a campaign launched by Nahnoo to demand the reopening of the last green space in 
Beirut (see Appendix D, sections 2 and 3 for details).  
3.1.2 Response	to	the	Waste	Crisis	
In late 2015, a movement emerged in the wake of a waste disposal crisis that affected 
Beirut for eight months. Following the closure of a landfill site close to Beirut, garbage 
accumulated in the streets. Consequently the You Stink movement, literally referring to 
the garbage and metaphorically implying the corrupt government, picked up momentum 
(BBC, 2015; Nader, 2015). The waste management crisis was but a reflection of the 
political dysfunction that runs deep in the state. As one blogger commented: "[t]he trash 
crisis in Lebanon is just a reminder of the system we live in. Stop being surprised. That's 
what we built” (BBC, 2015). Recurring political deadlock, interlocked with increasing 
economic hardships, seem to have exceeded citizens’ tolerance, leading to the 
apparent breakage of the sectarianism and eventually the launch of the movement 
(BBC, 2015). Far from being a mere reaction to the waste crisis, the series of protests 
represented a response to the absurd living conditions, starting from the ongoing 
electricity and water rationing to the sell-off of Beirut’s remaining public properties (The 
Economist, 2011). As one citizen complained, "No electricity, no water, no security, no 
president and on top of it all – rubbish" (BBC, 2015). The movement ultimately attacked 
the overall corrupt political regime. 
It should be noted that mobilization initiatives, specifically the You Stink 
campaign, are controversial and their impacts questionable. On the one hand, activists 
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are prone to being politicized by the zu’ama and it is difficult for mobilizations to survive 
the pitfalls of sectarianism. Even if when they do, their potential for effecting real change 
is highly doubtful, for the Lebanese political structure paralyzes any initiative that falls 
outside the negotiated sectarian and territorialized division of power. For instance, when 
the recent 2016 municipal elections in Tripoli went against the ruling elite, they 
responded by utilizing their political influence to disable and impede the function of the 
elected municipal council. The next section examines the neutralization of popular 
mobilization in more detail. 
3.2 Explanations	for	the	lack	of	mobilizations	around	water	justice	
If environmental campaigns are few, then campaigns that specifically target water 
injustices are noticeably fewer, not only in Tripoli but also at the national level. The 
finding of Ali Darwish remains true today:   
There is still a gap in the approach to water access from a human right concept. 
Very few national non-governmental or community-based organizations dealt 
with the water issues from an integrated human-rights-based perspective (2004, 
p. 22). 
 
Where local NGOs are involved with water, it is often to assume a role in service 
provision. Many work closely with international agencies such as Oxfam, CARE, and the 
UNHCR to provide water services for Syrian refugee camps and deprived 
neighbourhoods in Tripoli. For instance, the UNHCR has partnered with local NGOs to 
implement the WASH program, providing water and sanitation services in impoverished 
communities. One local NGO that works on the WASH project in Tripoli is Utopia. 
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According to representatives of Utopia, the latter started as a grassroots movement with 
advocacy orientations (C. Nachabe; personal communication, 2016). It eventually 
evolved into an established NGO, but lost its advocacy dimensions along the way. 
Utopia covers a range of activities that focus on capacity building and providing 
humanitarian aid to deprived populations (see Appendix C, section 4 for more 
information about Utopia).  
In fact, water advocacy is not prominent on the agenda of any organization 
nation-wide (C. Nachabe; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Of all the 
activists and NGO representatives interviewed during the research, the only 
organization claiming to have plans to pursue water advocacy was Nahnoo, an NGO 
based in Beirut. In the extensive 5-year study that Nahnoo is undertaking on all of the 
public services in Lebanon (including water, electricity, waste, etc.), water will be the 
last on the list (A.A., personal communication, 2016). 
In what follows, I explore a few different and interrelated explanations for the 
relative absence of activism on water issues. 
3.2.1 Complexity	of	the	Water	Sector	
The easiest place to start when attempting to explain the absence of activism around 
water is its complexity. The first reason for this complexity is that water management 
and policy making is scattered across several bodies, making it difficult for organizations 
like Nahnoo to mount campaigns that would achieve concrete policy change (A.A., 
personal communication, 2016). Second, the topic of water is manifold; there is water 
extraction, water monitoring and treatment, water delivery, water pricing and metering, 
etc. Third, and despite law 221/2000 that centralized water governance into four 
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regional establishments, many local committees that previously oversaw water 
governance remain in operation, and the RWEs are unable to stop them (A.A.; B. Jaber, 
personal communication, 2016). Fourth, the problem of illegal tapping into the public 
network is an issue that has become exacerbated given the increased demand after the 
influx of Syrian refugees, numbering 70,000 in Tripoli (CARE International, 2015). 
Finally, corruption exists in the form of water theft, where some intercept the public 
network at one point and sell it elsewhere, in which case municipal water becomes the 
object of black market exchange.  
3.2.2 Invisibility	of	Water	Injustices	
The complexity of water issues is not the only reason for its absence on the agendas of 
CSOs. Despite its pervasive role in daily routines, paradoxically, the social life of water 
seems easy for people to ignore. Water is invisible in many ways, such that the 
hydrosocial cycle itself is hidden as water runs under the streets and is thus out of 
sight.16 In some ways, inequitable access to water is invisible in the sense that “nobody 
has died of thirst” as Ali Darwish mentioned (personal communication, 2016). Also, 
other daily struggles seem to be more pressing than the lack of household water as 
various activists have reported (S. Annous, C. Nachabe, and A. Darwish, personal 
communication, 2016). Recognizing the limited data obtained through interviews with 
citizens, it should nonetheless be noted that a citizen of Tabbaneh, identified as the 
most impoverished neighbourhood in Tripoli, exclaimed that even when an aid agency 
installed water filters and cisterns in the neighbourhood, some residents chose to sell 
                                            
16 Based on discussion with Dr. Karim Eid-Sabbagh. 
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them out of extreme poverty in order to buy bread (citizen #3, personal communication, 
2016).  
Unlike other problems that are experienced with greater severity (such as 
electricity rationing, unemployment, extreme poverty, taxes, and lack of public spaces), 
people seem to find ways around water shortages such as resorting to bottled water, 
illegal wells, municipal public fountains, and water storage facilities. These strategies, in 
addition to the existence of social networks and other sources of income, have 
alleviated some of the burdens associated with water shortage (Darwish, 2004; Eid-
Sabbagh, 2014). While such practices do not address the fundamental problem, they do 
act as “pacifiers” (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). 
3.2.3 Clientelist	networks	
Given the nature of the Lebanese socio-political structure, political affiliations and 
patron-client relationships have become more prominent than state-citizen relations. 
People have learned to reach out to their patrons, who represent them politically and on 
the basis of religious sects, to seek services unfulfilled by the state. Local elites 
intervene in the water sector, i.e. maintaining patronage relationships, through charity 
and service provision (Allès, 2012).  
In terms of water services, local elites have used their political clout to secure 
water sources for and bring development projects to Tripoli, sometimes funding 
infrastructure projects themselves (Allès, 2012). Elites can also utilize their political 
networks to obtain permits that legitimize the existence of illegal wells, regardless of the 
capacity of groundwater. As Kingston states: “In a political system where political 
influence, rather than legal claims, have a dominant bearing on service provision and 
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law enforcement” (cited in Makdisi, 2007, p. 381), patrons have the power to cover their 
clients’ “fraudulent practices” (Allès, 2012, p. 399). Finally, local elites “act as 
indispensable intermediaries between the water users and the public utility" (Allès, 2012, 
p. 399). Similar practices can be found across Lebanon, where the elite are actively 
involved in distributing power and resources to secure self-interest and maintain control 
(Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). 
3.2.4 Weak	Civil	Society	–	Weak	Mobilization	Base	
The case of water gives us a window onto the weakness of civil society in Tripoli. Civil 
society in Lebanon, as Kingston (2001) describes it, is “weak and divided” (p. 56). It 
further lacks a large mobilization base as the impacts of local activism fail to transcend 
to the national-level (Kingston, 2001). NGOs, in particular, have limited freedom since 
they operate in areas that fall under the control of local leaders (Kingston, 2001).  
When CSOs do undertake mobilization efforts, public response tends toward 
apprehension or outright rejection. Several activists indicated that citizens tend to be 
slow in trusting and supporting civil society (A.A.; H. Khalaf; N. Shamaa; S. Annous, 
personal communication, 2016). The lack of public involvement is possibly related to 
several factors: lack of trust in NGOs and their transparency in general, lost faith in the 
responsiveness of the government, preoccupation with trying to make a living, and 
absorption in sectarian and political conflicts (A. Darwish; S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). As per Shamaa’s observation: 
The majority of participants in protests are the same; the same people keep on 
showing up again and again because it is difficult to mobilize citizens. This is 
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because the majority of people are politicized17 while the rest have no interest in 
participating (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).  
Samer Annous, the leader of the Civic Mobilization Network in Tripoli, made a similar 
comment, indicating that not many people were responsive to the network’s recent 
mobilizations around the protection of public spaces and historical monuments. In fact, 
many opposed. “The elite could easily recruit opponents [to our campaigns]”, he said, 
“including even academics and students” (personal communication, 2016). 
Even without the direct interference of sectarian elites in response to popular 
mobilizations, an absence of trust in CSOs could also be tied to the continuous 
disappointments and unmet expectations on the end of citizens. There is a lack of trust 
in the government’s responsiveness on one hand, and suspicions around the real 
motivations of the civil society groups themselves, on the other. Moreover, the presence 
of several negative experiences have led people to constantly question the hidden 
agendas of NGOs, especially given the fact that the elites have started to crowd the 
landscape with their own CSOs. 
Underlying these responses to the work of CSOs and activist networks is the 
chronic sectarianism of Lebanese politics, which has played a major role in redirecting 
ordinary people’s focus from social welfare issues towards divisive contentions. People 
have been pulled into sectarian conflicts, which are drawn out by political leaders over 
the course of decades. The public is involved (consciously or unconsciously) in 
advancing the agendas of the elite like pawns on a chessboard. According to Shamaa, 
“Sectarianism is causing colour-blindness” as it further distracts people away from the 
                                            
17 Politicization here means affiliation with a particular sectarian group. As a result, individuals 
refrain from engaging in mobilizations that originate outside that group or misalign with its 
agenda. 
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root causes to their problems and conceals entrenched injustices (personal 
communication, 2016). As a result, the space for public dialogue—and the formation of 
public opinion—is almost non-existent. Indeed, George Akl and Salah Saliba, both 
representatives of the DAI development company, claim there is no genuine public 
opinion. Rather, there is a mosaic of conflicting public opinions, the majority of which 
are the result of sectarian propaganda and political recruitment. 
Considering the You Stink campaign as an example, since it has been the largest 
of its kind in recent years, internal and external problems manifest. The mobilization 
failed in sustaining long-term momentum. Furthermore, the attempts of authority figures 
to hijack the movement succeeded in swaying some participants (G. Akl; A. Darwish, 
personal communication, 2016), a process aided by the internal confusion within the 
movement itself. According to Ali Darwish, who also participated in the mobilization: 
“There were 60 groups, the majority of whom got off track by their little 
disagreements…They were then penetrated by politicians here and politicians there”. 
Equally problematic was its representativeness of the larger population (G. Akl, 
personal communication, 2016); at best, the protesters reached 30,000 (A. Darwish, 
personal communication, 2016). Some even believe that the You Stink campaign was a 
political fabrication (G. Akl, personal communication, 2016). 
It should further be noted that the work of NGOs and activist networks is more 
reactive than proactive. For the most part, activists are engrossed in dealing with urgent 
issues related to the immediate impacts of development projects, which dictates the 
nature of issues that make it to the groups’ agenda. Often, activists have to act on short 
notice to mobilize against unexpected actions by the government (A.A.; S. Annous; A. 
 
 
 95 
Darwish; N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In the case of the Civic 
Mobilization Network, the activists are volunteers who have other full time commitments. 
This responsive mode helps to explain the lack of mobilization around water injustice, 
an issue that is chronic rather than acute, and does not seem to make headlines in the 
news.  
3.2.5 Passivity	and	Forced	Adaptation	
More subtly, the “resigned” attitude towards water displayed by many citizens can be 
explained by Mehta’s (2016) analysis, which suggests that underserved, semi-legal 
populations tend to accept their situations as inevitable. Instead of seeking social 
welfare and other services from the government, they tend to “opt out of the formal 
system, devise their own strategies and do not hope for any benefits from the state” 
(Mehta, 2016, p. 38). I noticed a similar condition in Tripoli through non-participant 
observation and interviews with citizens; while the majority of people constantly express 
their discontent with the government’s performance, they seem to have no expectation 
of any improvements. Ali Darwish described this pattern as “forced adaptation”, stating 
that: “They've tamed people over the past 25 years after the war to accept the situation” 
(A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Concerning Tripoli in particular, this 
passivity comes at no surprise given the systematic marginalization of the city (see 
Chapter II). The Minister of Social Affairs, also a native of Tripoli, expresses his 
discontent with the “striking passivity of the city’s vital forces, leaders and figures, and 
even its citizens in confronting this abnormal state of affairs”, further arguing that “Tripoli 
appears to have lost its internal vitality and its ability to advocate vocally for its rights” 
(Derbas, 2015, p. 20).  
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4 Conclusion	
From what has preceded, it is clear that mass mobilizations around the right to water 
are non-existent, neither in Tripoli nor on a national scale. Recently, timid local 
movements have emerged in response to certain issues – not including water – in 
Tripoli and in other areas in Lebanon. Some of the recent mobilizations have managed 
to halt top-down projects, others have failed, and all of them have encountered internal 
and external crippling impediments, including internal dissent, external pressures, 
sectarianism, and difficulty mobilizing the masses. One point to bear in mind is that the 
majority of activists and participants in those mobilizations belong to the middle class. 
This is important for two reasons. First it is crucial to note that middle class citizens can 
afford to buy more expensive privately-supplied water, and as a result are not likely to 
take up advocacy for water justice. Second, and more importantly, civil society activism 
is carried out by those who are politically enabled. If civil society had more room to 
operate in Lebanon, and could become an enabling space for a broader cross-section 
of Lebanese society, then perhaps water would find its way onto the political agenda.  
More prominent than mass mobilization are other forms of agency. Some of the 
ways in which residents in marginalized areas cope with the chronic water shortage 
include storing water in containers or roof tanks (usually installed by NGOs under the 
umbrella of WASH), carrying water from Hawuz (public fountains), or by negotiating with 
neighbours who may have access to private wells (citizen #1, personal communication, 
2016). It is common for many households to use municipal water points to obtain 
drinking water (ACTED, 2012). In some instances, residents obtain water through illegal 
tapping into groundwater or the public network (Darwish, 2004). While such acts may be 
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criminalized or considered unlawful, they reveal an underlying discontent with the 
performance of the state and perhaps even rejection of its authority. They represent a 
silent form of protest against injustices, and should therefore be seen as an expression 
of social agency rather than mere acts of disobedience. 
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Chapter	V:	Concluding	Remarks	
The world is witnessing a water crisis, manifest in the scarcity suffered by a large 
proportion of the global population. In mainstream discourse, water scarcity is 
normalized as natural, and solutions are seen to rest with proper management and 
technological fixes. In contrast, political ecology offers a different perspective based on 
the inseparability of human-nature relations. Political ecologists argue that underneath 
physical scarcity lie political, economic, social, and cultural power relations that 
perpetuate injustices. Water inequities should be recognized as problems of socio-
spatial inequalities rather than of scarcity, and need to be explained in light of the 
operating power structures.  
My case study, located in Tripoli, Lebanon, fits this perspective, where a hobbled 
political system embeds all kinds of social and environmental injustices. As shown in 
this paper, Tripoli suffers from widespread water problems that most adversely affect 
impoverished populations. With the majority of the population reliant on private sources 
for water supply, we might expect to see some sort of social movement taking place to 
assert citizens’ right to water. Nevertheless, I have argued throughout the thesis that 
inequitable access to water, even when it is a large-scale issue, may or may not result 
in its politicization in the form of mass mobilization. Although in some parts of the world 
water injustice has been a lightening rod for initiating mass mobilization, this link is not 
inevitable. Tripoli provides an excellent example where politicization of water injustices 
has not occurred. In fact, even mobilization around other kinds of social justice issues 
are of limited number, scale and consequence.  
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The Lebanese experience shows that the possibility of mobilizing for water equity 
does not solely depend on the prevalence of injustices, but is determined by other 
factors. Historical and political processes have produced contemporary societal spaces 
and structures, with the various kinds of opportunities and barriers they represent. In the 
case of Tripoli we can describe that structure as somewhere in-between an older pre-
modern model of self-regulating communities and the Western model of states and 
individual citizens. The resulting social order neither succeeds in transitioning towards 
democracy, nor manages to recover a robust renewal of pre-existing familial and social 
ties. This is a social order that preserves the localized nature of communities through 
territorial and sectarian divisions of power, where patron-client relationships prevail as 
mediating factors in the distribution of social welfare and state services. Water injustices 
can be understood as one outcome of this fragmented landscape, which irepresses, 
restricts, or at best distorts any potential social dissent around water or other social and 
environmental injustices.  
4.1 Obstacles	and	Challenges	to	Social	Mobilization	
The kinds of barriers that social justice activists have faced and will continue to face in 
Lebanon need to be approached strategically. Internal hurdles stem from the divided 
nature of the Lebanese political scene, where neutrality is a rarity. Even in the case of 
neutral CSOs that are not tainted by a certain political orientation, quite often the 
members will have varying political backgrounds, which increase their susceptibility to 
external pressure, potentially threatening the unity and solidity of the CSO. This is 
especially an issue in the case of coalitions that bring together NGOs and activists 
belonging to a wide range of political and sectarian alignments to work on a common 
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goal, in which case conflict and dissent are more likely to occur. Indeed, the diverse 
political inclinations of participants in some of the campaigns mentioned above, 
specifically the You Stink and Underground Garage, suffered from schisms generated 
by a few key participants (S. Annous; A. Darwish; N. Shamaa, personal communication, 
2016).  
At the same time that activists navigate internal divisions, they are also presented 
with external challenges. One pertains to the general lack of a large mobilization base, 
which undermines the ability of advocates to attract supporters and exert influence (A. 
Dawish, personal communication, 2016). Second, the international push toward an 
increased role for civil society since the 1990s, together with the availability of 
international funds, has led to the proliferation of NGOs. This has resulted in an 
overwhelming number of organizations in competition for scarce resources (volunteers 
and funds), limiting each group’s presence and influence (A. Darwish, personal 
communication, 2016). Moreover, local NGOs compete with those manufactured by the 
elite, who have more power and clout to influence the direction of funds and decision-
making about projects. Finally, the reliance of local NGOs on international funds has 
created relationships of dependence that could limit their agency.  
The third factor relates to the role of the media, which, although has been positive 
in some cases, proved restricting in others. Not only do activists lack access to and a 
strong presence in official media channels, but they also have to deal with distorted 
depictions of their mobilizations that are propagated by elite-controlled news sources 
aiming to diminish their significance or discredit their voices. In some cases, 
mobilizations are even subjected to a coordinated response, amounting to a “forced-
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media blackout” (Kassir, 2015). Activists often resort to social media as an alternative 
mode of communication, with varying degrees of success in combating the dominant 
media’s messaging. 
Fourth, activists who work to expose prevailing corruption face various kinds of 
risks. Many have been accused of being “anti-development” or “pro-poverty” as part of a 
counter-discourse propaganda employed by the elite (S. Annous; N. Shamaa, personal 
communication, 2016). This kind of discourse can be problematic because the majority 
of civil activists belong to the middle class and, by implication, are not perceived as 
representative of the poor (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). Therefore, they 
are vulnerable to such critiques, and potential delegitimization in the eyes of 
marginalized populations—even when activist efforts are directed at defending the 
rights of those populations. Furthermore, by using anti-development discourse against 
activist organizations, elites subtly advance neoliberal ideologies (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). Even more concerning, some activists have received life-
threatening warnings, and protestors have been subjected to violence at the hands of 
security forces (Kassir, 2015).  
A final obstacle faced by organizations advocating for substantive policy change 
lies in what some activists call the “invisible system”. This term refers to the ambiguity 
surrounding the decision-making process, which is related to the inter-sectoral elite 
bargaining that occurs out of reach of democratic process. In other words, policy 
decisions are often made behind the scenes and it is difficult to identify the points of 
influence that have determined the outcome.  
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4.2 Future	Opportunities	and	Strategies	for	CSOs	
The challenges discussed thus far provide lessons for future advocacy and other kinds 
of civil society work. Perhaps foremost among these lessons is that earning the public’s 
trust is key for the successful work of CSOs and for determining their degree of political 
influence. Attaining credibility and building a popular basis for CSOs among the public 
could help break the cycle of sectarianism as supporters unite around common social 
issues rather than around divisive religious and other loyalties. It is therefore important 
for CSOs to maintain a clear vision, transparency and overall political neutrality.  
Ali Darwish suggests that more broadly speaking, one potentially effective starting 
point for shifting systemic patterns of political influence is advocating for a change in 
electoral laws (personal communication, 2016). Since voting happens based on the 
place of origin rather than of residence, a large population in Tripoli and other cities 
remain unrepresented. This further undermines feelings of belonging, and forgoes an 
opportunity to hold authorities accountable. A change in the voting system could also 
help empower municipalities, which in the experience of activists are easier to influence 
than remote national authorities. Also, municipalities hold significant powers that remain 
under-tapped.  
In terms of a target population, there is consensus among research participants 
that youth are the most receptive to and believers in the work of civil society. They 
become especially enthusiastic once they realize the powers and privileges the 
municipalities hold and how effective they can be in causing change. For instance, 
Utopia strategically involves youth from marginalized communities in projects that foster 
place attachment, a sense of belonging, and social empowerment. Similarly, Nahnoo 
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has benefited from the involvement of youth in the project of Horsh Beirut, especially 
during the initial phase of conducting participant research to identify social needs and  
preferences (A.A., personal communication, 2016). The youth involved in that project 
continue to have a significant presence as volunteers to help with ongoing maintenance 
of the park and running events.     
Finally, given the struggle of many CSOs with official media channels, social 
media represents a powerful alternative, one that may even be more effective in 
influencing public opinion. Several activists indicated the significant role the social 
media had played in raising awareness and rallying for causes, and as a platform to 
counter mainstream discourse. One issue lies in the need for human resources in order 
to maximize the utility of social media, a capacity that many local NGOs and CSOs lack 
(S. Annous; A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Engaging the youth in social 
media affairs might help to address the lack in human resources while at the same time 
fostering a strong sense of community and activism.  
4.3 From	Water	Justice	to	Hydrosocial	Agency	
I started out this research with specific questions: to look for water justice movements 
that identify themselves as such. This approach proved to be limiting, for hydrosocial 
agency isn’t just manifested through political claims for water justice such as mass 
mobilizations. Whether or not water issues gets mobilized is shaped by the interaction 
of intertwining factors related to priorities, capacities, power structures, and political 
opportunities within the particular socio-political context in which a case is situated. 
Instead of mass movements, nuanced coping strategies were more relevant in the case 
study I undertook. Agency of this kind takes a silent form, manifesting through 
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navigating patron-client relations or more subtly through what would be considered 
unlawful acts of disobedience. If not directly political, such agency is certainly social and 
ecological, and forms part of the fabric of power relations. It embodies people’s 
endeavour to reclaim access to their habitats and ultimately sustain their existence. 
While I had not explored those coping strategies in depth, I should underscore them as 
crucial and emphasize the importance of further research in this direction. 
Navigating water inequities are in many ways unseen, related to the very nature of 
the water landscape. The invisibility of daily water struggles should come at no surprise 
given that water itself – its sources, allocation, and distribution – flows through channels 
that fall outside the immediate consciousness of most people. Both literally and 
metaphorically, water is hidden; it runs deep under the streets and so do the daily 
struggles in its pursuit. While political ecology scholarship points us to the importance of 
paying attention to the political claims for water justice, other invisible struggles must not 
be forgotten when water inequities are the object of interest. Keeping in mind that the 
politicization of the ‘right to water’ relates to the ways in which water injustices unfold in 
the public sphere, political ecologists need to pay closer attention to how other forms of 
agency operate in the absence of social mobilization. Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014) 
argue that "some injustices never produce open disputes or struggles but instead 
consist of the silent sufferings” (p. 15). It is my assertion that not only suffering is silent; 
a range of other “quiet” practices by which people lay claim to water resources should 
attract our attention as researchers. If this thesis only scratched the surface of such 
practices, I would put them foremost on the future research agenda for understanding 
hydrosocial relations in Lebanon. 
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Appendices	
Appendix	A	–	Water	Sector	Actors	
 
Figure 4: First category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014) 
 
Figure 5: Second category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014) 
MoEW	
Directorate	of	Hydraulics	&	Electrical	Resources	(GDHER)	
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Irrigation	
Other	Ministries	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	(MOA)	 Irrigation	
Ministry	of	Public	Health	(MOP)	 Water	quality	
Ministry	of	Environment	(MOE)	 Sets	environmental	standards	with	MoEW	and	penalizes	pollution	violations	
Municipalities	 Wastewater	
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Figure 6: Third category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014) 
 
Figure 7: Fourth category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014) 
 
Reconstruction	government	agencies	
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Appendix	B	–	Water	Laws	and	Regulations	
Table 5: Select Lebanese water laws and regulations (reproduced from Farajalla et al., 2015, pp. 30-32) 
Law Purpose 
Law 1913 Irrigation Law of the Ottomans 
Order No. 144, 1925 Protection of surface water and groundwater resources 
Order No. 320/26, 1926 Protection of catchment areas 
Decree No. 10231, 1955 Tripoli Water Investment System 
Decree No. 10276, 1962 Protection zones for water sources and recharge areas 
Law No. 66/20, 1966 Creation of the Ministry of Water and Electrical Resources  
Decree No. 3275, 1972 Creation of independent establishments for drinking water 
Decree No. 9627, 1996 Creation of a public institution called North Lebanon Water 
Establishment and the merging of some water authorities 
and committees within this authority 
Law 221, 2000 The consolidation of local water offices and committees into 
four regional water establishments, overseen by the MoEW 
Law 228, 2000 National privatization law to encourage the participation of 
the private sector in all sectors, including water and 
electricity. Law 228 establishes a framework where future 
public-private initiatives will be able to: 
Regulate the economic sector in question; Identify 
regulatory bodies to oversee public-private transfers and 
monitor privatized projects; Specify the duration of 
transactions pursuant to Article 89 of Lebanon’s Constitution 
Law 337 To separate between macro and micro management of 
water, and strengthen the policy of decentralization by 
granting more autonomy to regional WAs 
Law No. 401, 2003 Public participation in the management of the Tripoli Water 
Authority was approved 
Order of the Council of 
Minister No. 3, 2003 
10-year water plan for dams and mountain lakes 
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Appendix	C	–	NGOs	and	Advocacy	Networks	
1. Donia	for	sustainable	development	
A not-for-profit NGO based in Tripoli, Donia was established in 2013 and is headed by 
the activist and freelance journalist Nariman Shamaa. It is part of a larger inter-
governmental network of NGOs that come together under the umbrella of Anna Lindh 
Foundation, which aims to empower civil society across the Mediterranean to achieve 
cultural understanding (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-a). Similar to its sister cross-
national NGOs, Donia aims to achieve holistic sustainable development that takes into 
consideration the social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental aspects in light 
of international treaties and conventions (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b).  
Areas of focus include social justice, democracy, human rights, gender equity, 
economic and environmental sustainable development, and heritage preservation (Anna 
Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). From a social lens, the main objectives of Donia include 
reducing poverty, empowering marginalized populations, fostering a culture of peace 
and non-violence, and promoting gender equality (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). 
Economically, Donia works on fostering sustainable modes of consumption and 
production in an environmentally-friendly fashion while also creating employment 
opportunities for women, refugees, and immigrants (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). 
The cultural piece manifests in Donia’s campaigns for preserving historical heritage and 
monuments of cultural value (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). Politically, Donia 
advocates for human and civil rights, promoting citizenship, and increasing political 
participation (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). 
Donia played a crucial role in launching several campaigns, as Shamaa 
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recounted. Shamaa and her group of activists first started with a campaign to save 
Tripoli’s historical heritage. They signed petitions and rallied in front of the historical 
buildings and monuments that were to be demolished based on governmental decrees. 
Shamaa reported that this kind of mobilization had been absent before. Donia also gave 
birth to Our Sea, Our Land campaign that advocates for the protection of public 
properties on the sea front in Tripoli, and against the multiple illegal transgressions of 
public spaces.  
2. Committee	for	Monitoring	Tripoli’s	Projects	
The committee was founded by Donia for Sustainable Development in 2014 and is also 
headed by Nariman Shamaa. It comprises of a number of unions, community and 
familial organizations, associations (most notably the Association of Academics), 
experts (e.g. engineers and lawyers), former and current municipality members, 
business owners, and civil society activists, all having diverse political backgrounds (N. 
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). The committee started with around 74 
members, 40 of which were independent, but the number dropped as affiliated 
members resigned under political pressure; currently the committee consists of 54 
members (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).  
The committee oversees development projects proposed for the city of Tripoli 
and selects numerous social and environmental issues to focus on (N. Shamaa, 
personal communication, 2016). Examples of these include the protection of Tripoli’s 
historical heritage and public properties. They also focus on exposing the prevailing 
corruption, especially at the level of municipalities, and raising awareness among 
citizens (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). The committee issued a 
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declaration in 2015, demanding (a) the democratization of the decision-making process, 
particularly through involving civil society in regards to development projects concerning 
Tripoli; (b) implementing projects based on a clear vision as part of a holistic 
development plan that takes into consideration the historical significance of the city; (c) 
accelerating the completion of the construction of the eastern and western belts of El-
Mina bridge, which has been ongoing for decades; and (d) addressing the traffic crisis in 
the city centre (Alwifak, n.d.).  
A pivotal focus for the committee is unveiling corruption in Tripoli’s municipalities 
and empowering the latter to assume its powers. The current mechanism of decision-
making within the municipality is not based on comprehensive studies that put the 
interest of the citizens of Tripoli at the forefront (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 
2016). Shamaa attributed the strengths of the committee to the thorough research it 
undertakes to study proposed development projects. This approach, she continued, 
enables expert members to point to legal loopholes in prospective enterprises 
concerning the city. The members then coordinate with municipality members to discuss 
future steps. Some of the committee members are concurrently municipal officials. 
Shamaa believes that the committee’s work strengthened the status of civil society as a 
whole: “It has gained us, and thus civil society, credibility” (personal communication, 
2016). 
The committee’s work is collaborative and the members utilize a variety of 
mechanisms to pressure the government. By having expert members from various 
disciplines on board, the committee is able to conduct comprehensive studies of 
prospective development projects the government plans to undertake in Tripoli. 
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Additionally, social media plays a major role in publicizing events, rallying the masses, 
and exposing non-transparent deals that harm rather than benefit Tripoli and its citizens. 
Members of the committee are well-connected such that they are able to stay informed 
of new endeavours given their manifold networks in municipalities and other sources (S. 
Annous; N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In many cases, activists rely on 
word of mouth to keep up-to-date with governmental undertakings in order to plan their 
tactics/moves (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). This CSO collaborates with 
and receives valuable support from the Civic Mobilization Network. 
3. The	Civic	Mobilization	Network	
An unofficial network led by Samer Annous, an academic and activist, the Civic 
Mobilization Network is both organized and unorganized in the sense that it does not 
have an official designation as an established NGO. In fact, Annous prefers this form of 
social order as he stated: “I don’t believe in NGOs”. The (un)organized social order 
allows him and his fellow activists more freedom and flexibility, and keeps them immune 
to the numerous pitfalls that come with being part of an official organization. In this way, 
they are able to be effective without stumbling over the drawbacks that most NGOs are 
susceptible to. Moreover, Annous expressed his suspicions surrounding several existing 
nongovernmental organizations, especially given that many corrupt figures have 
founded their own, adopting deluding banners. In his opinion, many environmental 
organizations and experts are, indeed, “partners in crime” (personal communication, 
2016). He used the example of the You Stink mobilization, discussed further below, to 
illustrate how certain environmental NGOs were complicit. For instance, the Green 
Party had indicated that incinerators were harmless as the party’s secretary declared 
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her support of the minister (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). Overall, 
Annous acknowledged the efficacy of some NGOs but questioned the capability of 
existing traditional ones in Tripoli, in particular, to effectively lobby18 for change. Indeed, 
he voiced his concerns with the lack of ability to lobby, as did Shamaa who indicated 
that her group’s influence is not huge but partial and local.  
In terms of how this group works, Annous indicated that he coordinates with 
members in his social network to respond at a short notice to projects that are to take 
place at any point in time (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). As soon as they 
learn of new issues they react immediately by spreading the word through social media 
and written articles. They also collaborate with activists affiliated with other groups such 
as Tripoli’s Projects. The Civic Mobilization Network has been involved in several 
campaigns, including Our Sea, Our Land, which opposed the trespassing of the sea 
front of El-Mina and that of Tripoli. They had also taken part in the mobilization against 
the underground garage project, and in smaller protests against the demolishment of 
historical buildings in Tripoli (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016).  
The network maintains working relationships with journalists, who offer valuable 
support to the group’s endeavours. They also hold public meetings at the Association of 
Academics given that the latter is considered a neutral space. Another opposing 
mechanism is attending promotional events that the elite organize to market their 
projects; the activists offer a counter-discourse to raise awareness among the audience 
and expose the hidden agendas behind these projects (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). Of course, this has subjected the involved activists to various 
                                            
18 This is the term the participant used. 
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pressures as discussed further below. In terms of the activists’ backgrounds, Annous 
indicated that the majority of mobilizations have been initiated by academics or students 
since these tend to enjoy a relative degree of independence others may lack  (personal 
communication, 2016). That is, this category of activists is better able to withstand 
various kinds of pressure than are conventional employees or shop owners, whose 
livelihoods may be jeopardized in the process (S. Annous, personal communication, 
2016). 
The approach that the Civic Mobilization Network adopts is responsive, and more 
reactive than proactive, a strategy that seems to be paying off. The network was able to 
temporarily halt the Tripoli Sea Land project.  
4. Utopia	
According to representatives of Utopia, the latter started as a grassroots movement with 
advocacy orientations. It first focused on launching campaigns and eventually evolved 
into an established NGO (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). In the past, 
Utopia worked on establishing a few public water points (Sabeel), but these got 
discontinued since the WE had a limited budget to spend on projects in Tripoli (C. 
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). The committee of Utopia then decided to opt 
for more impactful projects such as solid waste management, drainage systems, 
drinking water treatment, and the installation of water tanks to cope with water 
shortages instead of smaller water supply facilities (C. Nachabe, personal 
communication, 2016). More recently Utopia has been involved in installing water 
pumps in some of the refugee camps in al-Koura. The other aspect of Utopia’s work 
focuses on humanitarian aid and capacity building. Examples of such projects include 
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fostering recreational activities, skill-training workshops, women empowerment 
initiatives, and engaging youth in projects that aim to rehabilitate and enhance street 
aesthetics in their own communities (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). The 
majority of its work is focused in Tabbaneh, Qobbeh, and Mallouleh, all of which are 
considered deprived, conflict zones (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016).  
The process of project selection passes through several stages. Utopia first 
consults with members of the community to identify their needs. Based on the outcome 
of the consultations and on expert assessments, Utopia proposes potential projects to 
its partners, who then seek the approval of the MoEW (C. Nachabe, personal 
communication, 2016). Utopia’s partners include all the NGOs that fall under the 
umbrella of the UNHCR e.g. CARE, Solidarity, René Mouawwad, and Coopi (C. 
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). 
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Appendix	D	–	Advocacy	Campaigns	
1. Our	Sea,	Our	Land	
A few development projects started to take place on the sea front of Tripoli and the 
coastal town of Mina, raising a great deal of attention and controversy. The unofficial 
Civic Mobilization Network, led by Samer Annous, in collaboration with other activists 
have advocated for the protection of public property on the sea front in Mina. Over the 
past few decades, the shore had undergone several pavement projects issued by the 
municipality to accommodate the city’s rapid urban expansion. On more than one 
occasion, though, the implemented pavement projects served as a preparatory stage for 
prospective investment enterprises of a private nature such as luxurious beach resorts. 
Annous explained how Tripoli’s bourgeoisie used their political clout to obtain the 
government’s approval of the proposed projects and to even alter the outcomes of 
environmental impact assessments to their favour (personal communication, 2016). 
For instance, a new fish market was established by a prominent local figure, 
Safadi, using the money of the World Bank. This illustrates the corruption on the end of 
international donors (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). The fish market was 
doomed to fail, as it was unnecessary and could not compete with the well-established, 
traditional fish market in the town: “That new fish market is not working anymore. It is 
just sitting there and being ugly”, one participant noted. Other failed projects include a 
life-saving boat, which cost around USD 100,000, donated by a European entity; the 
boat was quickly abandoned partly due to the lack of maintenance (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). 
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Even in cases where development projects were designated as public spaces, 
the process of their implementation was full of ambiguities. For instance, the 
implementation of a public park established on the small island adjacent to the shore 
lacked transparency (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). The project was 
made possible because of the influence of the minister of labour, who is also a native of 
Tripoli; he relied on his network to get the project approved (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). A number of problems surrounded the project’s execution. First, 
it was unclear how the project would be managed, who the beneficiaries were, or where 
the funding came from (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). This illustrates the 
double-sided role that NGOs can play, either positively or negatively. He further voiced 
his concern about the high probability of the presence of clientalism and nepotism in the 
undertaking of the project, and questioned its sustainability on the long term. Finally, the 
small zoo that was incorporated into the island, in his opinion, reinforces the colonial 
agenda that he and other activists are striving to combat. Below is an example of one 
project the Our Sea, Our Land campaign has targeted. 
2. Tripoli	Sea	Land	Project	
Most recently, expansive sea pavement and construction work have taken place on the 
sea fronts of Tripoli and El-Mina in preparation for the establishment of a large-scale 
project called ‘Tripoli Sea Land’ (Shamaa, 2016). The neoliberal enterprise is the 
offspring of the collaboration of ten of the country’s bourgeoisie (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). According to preliminary blueprints, Sea Land will comprise of 
housing units, touristic resorts, commercial facilities, and recreational amenities that will 
occupy a million m2 of land, part of which is public property (Shamaa, 2016). The 
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contractor company even proposed dedicating 300 m2 of land (currently occupied by 
municipal roads, gas stations, small convenience stores, and public spaces such as 
parks and mosques) towards the prospective project (Shamaa, 2016). If implemented, 
the project would require a daily water supply of around 1200 m3, an amount the North 
Lebanon WE is unable to provide (Shamaa, 2013). Additionally, a municipal report 
identified a total of 40 legal, environmental, and technical loopholes in the project 
(Shamaa, 2016). The contractor company had already proceeded with sea pavement 
along the shore well before a permit was issued by the municipality (Shamaa, 2016).  
The danger of such initiatives, in Annous’s opinion, is the associated 
demographic change they bring upon. Local residents, most of who come from 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, will be driven out of the area because 
they cannot afford the expensive housing. Moreover, the privatization of the sea front 
means that smaller kiosks and trades, and the day workers dependent on them, will no 
longer be welcome were the new developments to take place (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016). Street vendors would not be able to make a living if grand 
projects replaced existing humble structures. Moreover, the sea front represents one of 
the very few public spaces still accessible for people with modest means (S. Annous, 
personal communication, 2016). Any grand enterprise that follows the suite of the high-
end Solidere or Zaytouna Bay in Beirut will be detrimental to existing populations (S. 
Annous, personal communication, 2016).  
To promote these projects, stakeholders employ a discourse of fighting poverty, 
a propaganda Annous thinks is misleading as these projects are in fact fatal to the 
poor’s livelihoods (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). In his opinion, the goal 
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behind these profit-oriented projects is not to serve the poor as proclaimed by the 
stakeholders, but rather to change the demography of the area. Given that the majority 
of the sea front dwellers are considered poor, their existence negatively affects the 
investment factor (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). He contended that 
promoting these development projects as potentially bringing prosperity to the region is 
delusive, yet it often attracts the category of population that will be harmed the most (S. 
Annous, personal communication, 2016). The latter don’t realize that had these projects 
been implemented, they would no longer be able to enjoy a cup of coffee for a few cents, 
or make a living by carrying on with street vending activities (S. Annous, personal 
communication, 2016).  
Stemming out of the belief that any development project needs to consider the 
interests of the existing dwellers first and foremost, several civil societal groups 
coalesced to oppose the project, launching Our Sea, Our Land campaign (Shamaa, 
2016). The main groups involved were the Civic Mobilization Network and Tripoli’s 
Projects. They fought back through several mechanisms: demonstrations, counter-
discourse, social media, and published articles (S. Annous, personal communication, 
2016). When asking whether the struggle against the enterprise had been successful, 
Annous replied that the project did not pass, which would be considered a success. The 
movement’s exerted pressure managed to disable 16 voting trials in a single year 
(Shamaa, 2016). Due to the increasing objections and the efforts of the involved 
activists, the project was temporarily halted, awaiting the decision of the then to-be-
elected municipal council (Shamaa, 2016). 
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3. Underground	Garage	
Activists from the Civic Mobilization Network were also part of a campaign launched 
against a proposed underground garage that was to take place at the centre of Tripoli. 
The project had been on file since 2002 but never executed. Most recently, the Centre 
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) pressured the municipality to accelerate the 
project’s execution, but municipal members disapproved unanimously due to the 
environmental risks the project posed and the absence of a holistic development plan 
for the region (Al-Ankabout, 2016). Ten days later, the municipality revoked its refusal 
under pressure from the Future Movement political party, and the underground garage 
was soon underway (Al-Ankabout, 2016).  
Yet the project elicited concerns and faced objections by Tripoli’s Projects civil 
society group. In contrast to what was promoted, the underground garage would not 
help in solving the traffic crisis. Tripoli’s Projects committee got sidetracked by the 
venture, and had to put aside the 12 issues it had identified of interest to the citizens of 
Tripoli in order to rally against the underground garage initiative (N. Shamaa, personal 
communication, 2016).  
According to Shamaa, the activists had a clear vision and specific demands. 
They demanded that the municipality, which was unaware of the project, assume its 
responsibilities rather than remain marginalized in the face of decisions made by the 
CDR (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). Shamaa reported how some 
municipal members, who opposed the project initially, revised their positions under 
political pressure (personal communication, 2016). This resulted in animosity between 
the municipality and activists, who used a stern discourse against the government. The 
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activists were not “acting aimlessly” and were not necessarily opposed to the garage 
altogether, but rather to the mechanism through which it was being imposed (N. 
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In other words, they requested an overview 
of the development plan for the area and a thorough study of the traffic issue and 
environmental risks, both of which were lacking, in order to make informed decisions (N. 
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).  
The activists endured various kinds of threats and intimidation from authorities. 
Shamaa reported that she and other participating activists received life-threats and were 
subjected to emotional and psychological pressure; they also had to deal with yobs that 
powerful figures had recruited to deter the activists. Besides, the activists lacked solid 
support from citizens, whose initial response was discouraging and at-best cautious.  
While several groups initially coalesced to oppose the initiative, some of the 
participants eventually split up for various reasons. The intimidation techniques 
succeeded in discouraging a few people, and others were dissuaded by their political 
inclinations; the schism weakened the coalition (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 
2016). To pacify the outraged activists, the government conducted a study on the 
development of the city square, but Shamaa reported that the study was 
incomprehensive and contained ambiguities. Thus the protest continued, as did the 
implementation of the project. The breaking point was on a Sunday morning when 
Shamaa and three other women took to the street to prevent the commencement of 
construction work. They had to block the way with their bodies so as to stop the 
construction trucks from advancing. Following this incident, and after utilizing social 
media, the four activists finally managed to rally people around their cause. In the wake 
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of this mobilization, Shamaa re-invited the parties they were not on good terms with but 
found them responsive this time. So was Annous’s Civic Mobilization Network, and all 
participants camped in the city square for days (personal communication, 2016).  
The mobilization had a sounding effect, and managed to attract people from a 
variety of political backgrounds, including even proponents of the Future Movement, 
which was a major partisan of the project (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). 
Shamaa reported that authority figures tried to hijack the movement by politically 
penetrating the participants, but their efforts were in vain since the activists succeeded 
in maintaining a strong presence on the ground despite their diverse political 
orientations (personal communication, 2016). Shamaa was pleased with the support the 
movement received, including logistic and social media support. Eventually the project 
did not pass. Moreover, active members of the mentioned association made it into the 
municipality, which promises a better coordination between the municipality and Tripoli’s 
Projects committee towards the benefit of the city and its residents.  
4. Horsh	Beirut	
Nahnoo, a grassroots NGO based in Beirut, launched its first campaign in 2012 to 
advocate for the reopening of Horsh Beirut, the capital’s largest green space that had 
been closed since 1992 (NDI, 2015). A member of Nahnoo tells the story of the 
reopening of Horsh Beirut; through conducting participatory research and surveys in 
which the youth were engaged, Nahnoo found that the need for public spaces 
represented a first priority for the residents of Beirut (personal communication, 2016). 
Representatives from Nahnoo approached the municipality to raise the citizens’ 
concerns, but were faced with rejection on the premise that the municipality lacked the 
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resources to maintain the park once reopened (A.A., personal communication, 2016; 
NDI, 2015). Nahnoo then mobilized for the cause and managed to arrange for a public 
meeting with municipal authorities to discuss the issue (A.A., personal communication, 
2016; NDI, 2015). A.A. reported the official’s initial hesitation, but indicated that he later 
subdued under the pressure from the audience. By lobbying the municipality and 
engaging the public, Nahnoo succeeded in having Horsh Beirut reopened in 2015. It is 
worth noting that the NGO has played and continues to play a key role in supporting the 
municipality by preparing a plan for the proper management of the Horsh, overseeing its 
maintenance, and providing volunteers (NDI, 2015). Although the park remains open to 
date, Nahnoo’s struggle is ongoing against the government’s persistent, systematic 
encroachment of the park. 
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Appendix	E	–	Reflexivity	
Qualitative research encourages the practice of self-reflection in an attempt to invite the 
researcher to examine any prejudices or pre-held assumptions that may interfere with 
the credibility of research findings and analyses. Reflection is an opportunity for the 
researcher to situate him/herself and acknowledge the perspectives he/she brings into 
any particular research. Through recognizing personal biases, researchers become 
better capable of mitigating their impact on the quality of the research outcomes. 
Ultimately, those subjectivities shape not only the way a researcher sees and describes 
events but also determines how participants interact with him/her, and how the findings 
are later interpreted.  
In this section, I share parts of my background to help the reader understand my 
position as a researcher and how my location might have affected the conclusions I 
arrived at. I also share my own reflections on the interactions I had and the fieldwork 
experience as a whole. 
Personal	Background	
I am a Muslim Sunni female of Middle Eastern ethnicity. At the time of fieldwork, I was in 
my mid twenties. I was born in the town of Mina, Tripoli the same summer the civil war 
ended, but my first-hand experience living in Lebanon was limited to the 24 months I 
spent there as an adolescent, besides short annual visits. In this sense, I consider 
myself both an insider and an outsider. I am an insider given my familiarity with the 
culture, language, and Tripoli’s layout, and the fact that I could blend in as I am unlikely 
to be spotted as an outsider roaming about the city. This acted as a catalyst such that I 
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did not need extra time in the field to learn the language and find my way around. 
Tapping into the connections I already had helped me to recruit participants faster than I 
would have otherwise. My Middle Eastern identity and knowledge of Arabic also allowed 
me to connect to locals spontaneously and enabled me to understand daily 
conversations that took place in public spaces, thus enriching my data collection and 
overall field experience. 
At the same time, I could be considered an outsider because of my minimal 
background living in the city; the sense of place I feel toward Tripoli differs from that of 
full-time inhabitants as I had a different level of attachment to and a more complicated 
relationship with the city. The latter is constantly shifting. Coming from a middle-class 
family and having had very limited experience living in Tripoli, I hadn’t experienced 
water stress the way inhabitants of the city might have. Part of my outsider identity 
comes from my position as a novice researcher such that the knowledge I possessed of 
the water sector dynamics, the actors involved, and the political-economic landscape in 
my chosen case study was meagre prior to fieldwork. I believe this worked to my 
advantage in the sense that it increased the credibility of my findings. A lowered level of 
expectations helped me to keep an open mind to a variety of perspectives as I sought 
answers to the questions I set out to investigate.  
Having been exposed to some kind of gender discrimination in Tripoli in the past, 
I expected to face a similar prejudice during my fieldwork. For the most part, this wasn’t 
the case as I found most people I came in contact with extremely respectful. One 
exception was during an interview with a male participant; I felt intimidated by his 
interrogative behaviour. The gender factor also had some impact on my mobility, 
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especially restricting the time frame within which I could wander alone and determining 
the neighbourhoods I could visit unaccompanied. In some instances, I felt unsafe 
walking into isolated areas on my own, especially ones where armed conflicts have 
taken place more recently. However, I would say that my identity as an outsider to those 
communities played a more prominent role in holding me back from pursuing further 
interaction with residents than did my gender; I was self-conscious about my position as 
a Canadian researcher and felt concerned about how citizens would perceive me, and 
what power dynamics might be at play. In addition, the living conditions I witnessed 
during my brief visits to those neighbourhoods were disturbing and magnified my 
concern of the power distance. Both of these factors, in addition to the limited time I had 
in the field, prevented me from doing more work with those communities than I had 
hoped to. Other times, I felt that being a young female worked to my advantage, 
possibly rendering me less threatening and thus facilitating my initial interaction with 
others.  
Assumptions	
Prior to conducting interviews, I wasn’t sure what to expect but I had assumed to find it 
difficult to recruit participants because of the laid-back nature of the country. To the 
contrary, I found most people whom I had contacted responsive and timely. I was also 
concerned about the responsiveness of government officials, but found the majority 
willing to cooperate, except for one incident when a high-profile figure at a public facility 
refused to meet with me. A few other researchers I had been in contact with reported a 
similar response. Most of the other participants I had interviewed seemed cooperative 
and sympathetic, supportive even.  
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Given the existing sectarian divisions across Lebanon, I had concerns about how 
my identity as a Muslim, visible through my name and head cover, affected the way 
others perceived me. I wondered whether some would be apprehensive or feel 
uncomfortable participating in the research, but I encountered no such behaviour at all. 
To the contrary, most were friendly and open-minded. Being aware of the entrenched 
sectarianism, I felt uncertain—sometimes sceptical—of movements that claimed 
neutrality. After meeting several activists, however, I became convinced of their genuine 
anti-sectarian position. 
Since I had already prepared a set of questions for each category of the 
participants, the questions I asked were fairly consistent across the interviews. The 
questions were approved by my supervisor prior to the commencement of fieldwork, 
which helped in eliminating personal biases I might have been oblivious to otherwise. 
The semi-structured design ensured consistency while allowing me the flexibility to 
pursue emergent themes I may not have accounted for. I had no emotional or other kind 
of personal connection to any of the participants. Being a naturally good listener, I am 
confident that I was equally attentive during all of the interviews regardless of the 
participant’s position or status.  
As a native of Tripoli, the major bias I brought to this project was the choice of 
the case study itself. To mitigate prejudice, I adopted a systematic approach when 
designing the study by adhering to the ethical standards of the academic institution, and 
the research protocol established by the social science scholarship. I also extensively 
discussed my research findings with my supervisor, and briefly with other researchers. 
Therefore, I’m confident in the transparency of the collected data and the credibility of 
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my analytical approach. Another bias I was aware of relates to the common belief in 
Tripoli’s marginalized status, a discourse I had been repeatedly exposed to at different 
stages of my life. I was concerned that my location as a citizen of Tripoli had nudged me 
to unjustifiably believe in what could be identified as a conspiracy theory. I had initially 
avoided raising the subject or incorporating it in my written material out of concern of 
succumbing to an unverified bias. However, the marginality theme persistently 
appeared in people’s daily conversations, newspaper articles, and social media. Taking 
into consideration that people’s beliefs shape their realities and identities to a certain 
extent, I felt obliged to explore the topic regardless of whether or not the claim was true.  
Throughout fieldwork, I found that I had to continuously remind myself to refrain 
from victimizing residents who struggle with water shortage, but to recognize their social 
agency in overcoming hardship. I wouldn’t have arrived at such a mindset had I not 
been exposed to political ecology literature.    
Rethinking	Fieldwork	
If I were to do this fieldwork again, I would allow myself more time in the field in order to 
gain a comprehensive picture of the civil society landscape. Due to the lack of presence 
of many NGOs and activist network on the web (maybe more so the lack of a reliable 
database that documents existing ones), I found that I needed extra time on the ground 
to trace down existing organizations, and fully understand the extent of their 
involvement with citizens and the kinds of issue they work on. More time would have 
also allowed me to investigate in more depth the controversial issue of the Jannah dam, 
which is the closest to what we would consider an environmental movement. I would 
have also discussed my research findings with local researchers, whose expertise 
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would have provided different perspectives into my work and crystallized my 
understanding of the regional dynamics. Finally, if I were to do this research again, I 
would appreciate collaborating with a local NGO, which would have enabled me to do 
more work with communities. 
The biases I have shared in this section are the ones I am aware of, but there are 
certainly other factors I may be oblivious to. I recognize that this work represents one 
snapshot of a specific moment in time and space, a single perspective of a multi-faceted 
reality. My research as I view it is but an attempt to engage in the ongoing academic 
conversation that had started long before me and will continue long afterwards. 
Realizing that no human work is perfect, I welcome opinions, feedback, and 
contributions with an open mind.  
 
